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INDO V E B M L T 2

2 Quotes from "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization" by Elton Mayo, Macmillan, N.Y. 1933.

(Chap 'What is Monotony') [Quoting from W. L. W. "The Effects of Monotony" Ind. Fatigue Research Bd. 2/2]

pp 44-46 Boredom (interpreted to mean a general down-grade rather than up-grade mental accompaniment to work, a 'minus' rather than a 'plus') is less liable to arise:

- (a) "When the form of activity is changed at intervals within the spell of work."
-
- (b) "When the operatives are paid according to output produced instead of time worked."
-
- (c) "When the work is conceived as a series of self-contained tasks rather than as an indefinite and apparently interminable activity". Various expressions very generally in use amongst the operatives

Q (male spinning) convinced us that they regarded their work as 'an indefinite and apparently interminable activity'. To which they added forceful epithets.

(d) "When the operatives are allowed to work in compact social groups rather than as isolated units'. The arrangement and nature of the work ~~produced~~ precluded any sociability or conversation. Although there were two or three pieces in each alley, they were always remote from each other and isolated, unless emergency, which equally precluded sociability, brought them briefly together again.

(e) "When suitable rests are introduced within the spell of work. There had been no official rests, few

④ if any authorized breaks, and no suggestion of rest pauses at the time when the inquiry began.

"At the beginning of the inquiry there were difficulties of observation owing to the fact that this was merely the label of many investigations. The men were settlers under observation, and the management were ~~unaware~~ ^{unaware} of this.

At this point we were greatly helped by the collaboration of the Graduate Medical School of the University of Pennsylvania in the placing of a small dispensary in the plant with a qualified nurse in charge. ----

But the nurse in charge, in addition to her hospital qualifications, was an expert 'interviewer'. The method she followed was very similar to that described

Q above by Culpin and Smith. She found that the majority of those who visited her were glad to 'give a very detailed personal account' of themselves. In all such situations she would listen carefully and would not 'interfere with questions'. ---

p. 73. "The most significant change that the Western Electric Company introduced into its 'test room' bore only a casual relation to the experimental changes. What the Company actually did for the group was to reconstruct entirely its whole industrial situation. Miss Mary Smith has wisely observed that the repetition work is 'a thread in the total pattern', but ~~that~~ 'is not the total pattern'. The Company, in the interest of developing a new form

9 of scientific control - namely, measurement and accurate observation - incidentally altered the total pattern, in Miss Smith's analogy, and then experimented with that thread which, in this instance, was the work of assembling relays. The consequence was that there was a period of during which the individual workers and the group had to re-adapt themselves to a new industrial milieu, a milieu in which their own self-determination and their social well-being ranked first and the work was incidental. The experimental changes - rest-pauses, food, and talks at appropriate intervals - perhaps operated at first mainly to convince them of the major change and assist the readaptation. But once

Q the new orientation had been established,
it became proof against the minor
experimental changes." [5 gals, ^{plus one to bring in parts} on this
repetitive work were put in a room by
themselves, under good conditions of
light, heat, ventilation, humidity.
careful. ~~single~~ individual records of production.
less supervision. Rest periods in middle
of A.M. + P.M., ^{+ times to talk.} also food. Production
went way up & stayed up for 5 yrs)

74. "May Smith quotes Cyril Burt's apt description of 'multiple determination' in his discussion of juvenile delinquency. 'A particular result is not caused by some one factor operating equally on all people, so that the presence of this factor invariably would produce the same results.'

9 Better is it that there are several factors which together, operating on a particular Temperament, will produce the result. The Fatigue Laboratory researches show us a number of mutually dependent factors in equilibrium, a change in external conditioning, and a change throughout the whole organization which is the organism. In the presence of such a change the individual may be able, by virtue of a shift of inner equilibrium, to keep going, without effort or damage; the diagram which showed the difference between the athlete and untrained persons illustrated this.

75. The inner equilibrium may be temporarily overthrown, in which case the untrained man stops

muscles
in a state
of fatigue

2
running. The athlete can achieve a
'steady state' in a greater variety of
external changes and under conditions
demanding much greater effort -
having achieved this adjustment
of inner equilibrium he 'keeps on
going indefinitely'. The Western
Electric experiment was primarily
directed not to the external condi-
tion but to the inner organization.
By strengthening the 'temperamental
inner equilibrium' of the workers,
the Company enabled them to
achieve a mental 'steady state'
which offered a high resistance
to a variety of external conditions.

" I have said that this is
merely descriptive and is no more
than a first step towards the

9 requisite analyzing. T. N. Whitehead, by a fortunate use of mathematics, has embarked upon an analysis of the records of output which promises to be of highest interest. --- For example, he tends to the view that learning and skill are not capacities which are achieved once and for all time by a given individual. On the contrary, the individual's skill is re-achieved each day and consequently depends in some degree upon the external conditions of that day and inner equilibrium, while this would probably be admitted at once by any neurologist, its demonstration from a working curve is unusual. He finds also that in a group such as that described the

"keep the heart with all
diligence", etc.

Q

76

determination of muscular movement is partly socially and partly individually conditional. The gross muscular movements seem to be determined by one's neighbors after some years of association; the manipulative movements appear to be more individual. " ---

pp 12-19. 5 miles up at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory where various subjects ~~was~~ ran on a treadmill at a rate of 7.3 kilometers per hr for 18 to 20 minutes. They were in different degrees of training, the athlete being a man of 40, the one in poorest training who had never run before was a boy of 18. The indices measured were lactic acid increase, carbonic acid ^{absorption} capacity of blood, the pulse rate

and net oxygen consumption per kilogram
of body wt. The studies were first
reported in the Journal of Physiology Vol LXVI
2, Oct 10, 1928 "Studies in Muscular
Activity" by Dr. D. B. Hill; also in
'Living Machinery' by A. V. Hill (Sarnell
lectures), and 'Physiological Changes Occurring
in Man at Work' by A. V. Hill, D.B.
Hill and others, J. of Physiology,
Vol LXVI, # 2 Oct 10, 1928.

14 "From the standpoint of the efficiency
of the body as a machine, final anal-
ysis of the data above presented
shows the great advantage of viewing
the organism as a result of physical
training. The superiority of the athlete
lies in his ability to meet the demand
for oxygen, enabling him to main-
tain an internal environment vary-

ing within narrow limits only from the resting state. It is a well-established principle in physiology that function and use go hand in hand. The increased metabolism resulting from muscular exercise is met effectively only in the trained subject, through the co-ordination of a number of factors, the response, in general, being about what might be expected in a well-integrated system accustomed to such demands. - - -

"Physical training increases the lung capacity, induces a slow pulse rate, increases the stroke volume of the heart, reduces systemic blood pressure during work, and probably greatly increases the capillary diffu-

tion area in the muscles as it does in the lungs. Coördination of these and other unknown factors by the nervous system results in the provision of an adequate supply of oxygen to meet the needs of the organism up to levels of relatively severe work, with the maintenance of optimum conditions within the body for long periods of time. ---

23. "On the other hand, the physiologists equally describe and measure situations in which the individual continues to perform the task at hand — even under the experimental conditions. In such instances, they point out, he achieves a 'steady state'. He is equal to the task, his inner equilibrium is maintained at

the higher expenditure of energy.

'Similarly during continuous muscular exercise a 'steady state' is reached when the demand for oxygen is adequately met. Such a steady state implies a relatively constant total ventilation, elimination only of carbon dioxide produced in metabolism, steady pulse and respiratory rates and, a constant internal environment. Given that an individual can achieve this steady state, one is entitled to expect that 'optimum conditions within the body' will be maintained 'for long periods of time'.

[Relate this to psychological calm produced by meditation.]

p. 110. [Referring to Janet's 'Les Obsessions et Psychasthénie' and 'Les Névroses']
 "In these studies he insists, and illustrates freely from case material, that the chief characteristic of obsession is an utter incapacity to respond adequately to any present situation and especially to a social situation. Even when alone these subjects are afraid of, and avoid, any thing of the nature of decision or action. In describing this incapacity in greater detail, Janet first points to the highly organized and complex equilibrium involved in any ordinary act of attention in the normal person. It is customary to speak of attention as if it were essentially

a simple fact — the characteristic unit, as it were, of mental life. We make this assumption because the individual of normal organic and mental health easily concentrates upon this or that aspect of the world about him without ever realizing how complex are the controls he takes for granted. Our mental life, says Janet, 'not only consists of a succession of phenomena coming one after the other and forming a long series — but each of these successive states is in reality a complex state; it contains a multitude of elementary facts and owes its apparent unity to synthesis alone, to the

equilibrium of all these elements!
 Since it is only by means of attention, and the organization which it presumes, that we can actively relate ourselves to the reality about us, it follows that any individual in whom this capacity is in any degree diminished, but whose mentality is otherwise undamaged, experiences a feeling of incompleteness and unreality which makes him still more miserably aware of his difference from, and inferiority to, other people. Janet points out that obsessives are 'perpetually distracted'; they have great difficulty in attending or 'putting order into their ideas'. Difficulty of 'fixing and maintain-

relate this to
 meditation.

ing attention' is 'their chief trouble'. There may be an exaggeration of spontaneous attention with a weakening of voluntary attention — when they begin to do some simple act they find it difficult to stop. The constant re-checking of their work mentioned by Culpin and Smith is thus always present as a symptom. Such subjects are very doubtful of descriptive studies in which there is some question of fact; they prefer ideas and above all abstract ideas.

113. Janet demonstrates at length that a person who is not in any sense an obsessive will nevertheless respond obsessively

to any experience of obvious personal inadequacy in a situation which is to him important. Any sufficiently wholesale disturbance of an individual's personal equilibrium with the reality about him will tend to carry an obsessive consequence in his thinking. The provoking occasion may be an organic unbalance, one of the fatigues; or it may be a social experience of personal futility. In either event he will display for the time being the obsessive reverie, the elaborate indecision, the morbid preoccupation with unreal personal issues. If he cannot adequately 'think through' the situation to amended action, he

will proceed to 'overthink' his situation in terms of false alternatives, just as the obsessive does. For the period of such disturbance, even the most capable individual will lose his usual control both of attentive capacity and of reflection or reverie. He will suffer a diminished power of quick adaptation to actual situations, especially the social, he will be unable, for the time being, to prevent himself from thinking in an exaggerated and distorted fashion about himself and other people. --

114. (1) Is there some experience which might be described as an

experience of personal futility - a common incident of industrial organization for work?

(c) Does life in a modern industrial city in some unrealized way predispose workers to obsessive response?

118. --- "The condition of affairs which revealed itself was not at all that which might have been expected. There was no great evidence of that 'deadening' effect of machine minding or routine work which literary critics commonly suppose to be the chief problem of a mechanical age. There was no reason to suppose that the personal or human quality of the supervision was essentially de-

fective. But many 'conflicting
forces and attitudes' were
'working at cross purposes with
each other.' This conflict centered
about 'the focal point' of an
industrial situation; namely,
the work and the manner of
114 its performance. Somehow or
other, no effective relationships
between 'the worker and his
work' had been established,
and since a community of
interest at this point was
lacking the group failed to
establish an integrative activity
and fell into a degree of dis-
cord which no one could
understand or control.

"In a particular instance it was

found that neither the supervisors nor any of the working group really knew the 'boze' that had been set nor the facts considered in its determination. They did not clearly understand the method of payment on the job. The whole department echoed with protective devices, some of which were known to the supervisors and others not so known. On a first observation there was a tendency to ascribe this to an alleged habit of 'restricting output'; it was speedily found that this phrase expresses a gross simplification which is essentially untrue. Apparently it is not enough to have an enlightened

Company policy, a carefully
designed (and blue-printed) plan
of manufacture. To stop at
this point, and merely ad-
minister such a plan, however
logical, to workers with a
take-it-or-leave-it attitude
has much the same effect
as administering medicine to
a reluctant patient. It
may be good for him, but
he is not persuaded. If an
individual cannot work with
sufficient understanding of his
work situation, then, unlike
a machine, he can only
work against opposition from
himself. This is the essential
nature of the human; with all

the will in the world to coöperate,
 he finds it difficult to persist
 in action for an end he cannot
 dimly see. From this it
 follows that the more intel-
 ligent an industrial method,
 the more difficulty does it
 encounter in performance and
~~and~~ action. This is because if
 intelligent it changes as a
 method in response to exter-
 nally dictated need or with the
 progress of invention — and fails
 to carry its workers intelli-
 gently with it. Many var-
 eties of restriction were discov-
 ered at Hawthorne, but
 wherever the symptoms described
 as 'restriction' clearly showed

themselves, something of exasperation or a sense of personal futility was also revealed. There was a conflict of loyalties - to the Company, to the supervisor, to the working group - and no possibility of solution, except by improved understanding. Whether they admitted 'stalling' or no, workers expressed their dislike for a situation which imposed upon them a constraint and a disloyalty. Evidently the more intelligent a company policy, the more necessary is it that there shall be a method of communicating understanding

'down the line'. And this method of communication must include the interview - that is, it must know and effectively meet the real difficulties which workers themselves experience and express, and must take account also of personal disability: - - - -

"Human collaboration in work, in primitive and developed societies, has always depended for its perpetuation upon the evolution of a non-logical code which regulates the relations between persons and their attitudes to one another. I insist upon a merely economic logic of production - especially if the logic is frequently changed - inter -

force with the development of
make a code and consequently
give rise in the group to a
sense of human defeat. This
human defeat results in the
formation of a social code at a
lower level and in opposition to
the economic logic. One of its
symptoms is 'retention'. In
its devious road to this enlighten-
ment, the research division had
learned something of the personal
exasperation caused by a
continued experience of incom-
prehension and futility. It
had also learned how serious a
consequence such experience
carries for industry and for the
individual. ---

122. -- "There is a question formulated by the research division at Hawthorne which we take with us, the second of the two stated in the last chapter: Does life in a modern industrial centre in some unrealized way predispose workers to obsessive responses? We may take it as decided that it is far too easily possible for an intelligent worker to experience something of futility and exasperation in modern industry and business, although little can as yet be said of its occasion. ---

126 [referring to 'Delinquency Cases' by Clifford Shaw, U. of Chi. Press 1929]
 -- "Shaw says. It has been

quite common in discussions of delinquency to attribute causal significance to such conditions as poor housing, overcrowding, low living standards, low educational standards, and so on. But these conditions themselves probably reflect a type of community life. By treating them one treats only symptoms of more basic processes. --- In short, with the process of growth of the city, the invasion of residential communities by business and industry causes a disintegration of the community as a unit of social control. This disorganization is intensified

by the influx of foreign national
and racial groups whose old
cultural and social controls
break down in the new cul-
tural and social situation of
the city" - - -

"According to ~~Shaw~~ Clifford
Shaw, delinquency and crim-
inality are symptoms of the
disintegration of social controls.
Since misunderstanding is
possible, it is necessary to
point out that Shaw does
not mean the kind of control
exercised by another person, by
a court of law, or a legislative
mandate. He means the inner
compulsions to think and act
in a way that is socially

acceptable, a compulsion which is imposed upon an ordered community by social tradition. This is the only compulsion that is ever really operative in a social group; courts and their principal officers - legislative enactments are effective only when they express an implication of an accepted and traditional method of living.

"Shaw calls attention to the fact that an increase of delinquency and crime is indicative of disintegration in those social controls which are necessary to ordered living and progress. But there are not the only symptoms. Dr. Cavan in his study of the incidence

of suicide in Chicago ["Suicide", by Ruth
Shoule Cavan, U. of Chi. Pr. 1928] is also
able to use maps similar to those used
by Shaw and to demonstrate that the
rate of suicide is highest in those
areas which show other evidence of
social disorganization. There is not a
complete coincidence with the Shaw
areas, because in Chicago, as in other
communities, occupational ~~types~~^{groups} of a
professional type, for example, show a
comparatively high suicide rate. This
lack of complete coincidence is, however,
of special interest because the Cavan
hypothesis, that 'personal disorgani-
zation' follows a breakdown in com-
munity organization, finds confirma-
tion even with respect to the profes-
sional instances in special case studies.

Delinquency and crime as evidence
mainly of gross breakdown; it does
not follow that a relative freedom
from gross breakdown indicates
immunity ~~to~~ to social disintegra-
tion." [Breakdown is not wholly an
accurate word, for in many instances
the community has never existed in
health at all. Cf. crime of Middle
ages in Europe. ~~King~~] [Relate the
forgoing to tasks of perfect needs]

- 128 "There are many of us who ~~the~~ tend
to think of the alleged 'new freedom'
in act and thought, possessed by
an individual in a modern society, as
clear gain. Such thinking is heedless
of two facts: there are, first, that a
diminished social control demands an

129

cession of intelligent self-control and, second, that any movement in the direction of this so-called freedom withdraws from the individual a measure of social understanding and support which he is usually unable to do without."

129 [Re Durkheim] "His main purpose even in the year 1897 was to show that an industrial civilization, in proportion as it undergoes rapid development, tends to suffer from an ill which he terms anomie - anomia. This has sometimes been literally translated as 'lawlessness' - which does not quite express Durkheim's meaning. His central claim is, first, that a small society lives in an ordered manner such that the interests of its

members are subordinated to the interest of the group. He does not mean anything that is political or, in any explicit sense, moral by this subordination. His reference is rather to the fact that an individual born as member of such a community can, during infancy and adolescence, see ahead of him the function he will unquestionably ~~perform~~ fulfill for the group when he is an adult. This anticipation regulates his thought and action in the developing years, and in adulthood culminates in satisfaction and a sense of function for, and vicinity to, the society. He is throughout life solidary with the group. Modern development, Durkheim,

him doing, has brought to an end
 this life of satisfactory function for the
 individual and the group. We are
 facing a condition of anomie, of
 planlessness in living, which is
 becoming characteristic both of
 individual lives and of communities.
 This is due, at least in part, to
 economic development. 'For as long
 as a producer could only dispose of his
 products in the immediate vicinity,
 the moderate gain possible did not
 greatly overrule his ambition.
 But now that he can claim the
 whole world for customer
 base, before so unlimited a prospect,
 can his ambition continue to accept
 its former limitation?' Durkheim
 contends that individual increasingly

are passing into restless movement,
planning self development - a method
of living which defeats itself
because achievement has no longer
any criterion of value; happiness
always lies beyond any present
achievement. Defeat takes the
form of ultimate disillusion - a
disgust with the 'futility of
endless pursuit' - --

132. " In all the early stages of his
development the child requires a
normally constituted home and
family affection; he needs also and
equally the companionship of
other children of his own age under
the conditions afforded by an
ordered society. The unit of
social explanation is not the

human individual, nor is it the family; it is a group of families living in an ordered relation with each other. [Can par. acts a substitution to be the means of making part of that ordered relation of families? (Heg)] Freud has succeeded in showing that the obsessive is socially maladjusted, that his attitude even to his own family is peculiar and distorted. Further investigation shows that the family which produces him is itself inadequately related to the communal life. The effect of Freud's inquiry is therefore to demonstrate that the maladjustment of the neurotic is a social maladjustment; his disability is not an individual but a social problem. ... If we disregard

the controversial aspects of his theory we are most certainly entitled to conclude from his inquiries that any social situation which shows extensive disorganization will also show a higher tendency to ob-
[ex] vision in its individual members than an ordered community. This will not necessarily find expression merely in a greater number of extreme cases; it will also show itself in the form of a higher incidence of desecious thinking in those who otherwise are sufficiently 'well adjusted' and sufficiently capable of social living." - - -

135.

" - - But, says Plant, in helping a neurotic, the psychiatrist sometimes forgets to ask whether there is

any longer a social order to which the patient may adjust. ----- Plant goes on to point out that in a surrounding such as this, one cannot expect children to grow up with the same sense of social significance and order, with the same capacity of self-control, as children brought up in an environment of greater stability and more obvious collaborative function. --- Just as our political and economic leaders have for two hundred years tended to take account of only of the economic functions involved in living, so also in our actual living we have inadvertently allowed pursuits of economic development to lead us into a condition of extensive social disintegration. As Hildebrand

The reason for the increase of joint control of industrial and social functions, in all countries, and (2) is an industrial and social change (3) our growth and

ings, the most important problem for a complex and rapidly changing society is the continuance of men that will secure the preservation of a social integrity of function side by side with the development of function. It is probable that the work a man does represents his most important function in the society; but unless there is some sort of integral social background to his life, he cannot even assign a value to his work. ---

147. (P) In saying laissez-faire strongly "Brill" failed to see that the tenets of Durand's statement [that political govt. should leave industrial development to work out its own destiny] is limited to those

situations in which the integrity and health of the social organism can be assumed. Through the nineteenth century industry developed greater complexity, and popular government was extended by successive stages; finally certain symptoms of the social anomie of which Durkheim speaks began to manifest themselves. With the emergence of these symptoms political activities were redoubled, but questions of the health of the social organism still received no attention. Thus as other functions of social control diminished or disappeared and the political function alone survived, political control again emerged as the sole organ in actuality of social organiza-

tion. This was not interpreted as being the almost invariable symptom of social ill health that it historically is; it was welcomed as a liberal advance. So the doctrine which began by assigning to political regulation a subsidiary function in social organisation, ended by finding it the only available means to such organisation. An unduly abstract political theory had permitted important social changes to pass unnoticed. ---

(b) "Ignorance and uncontrol of social change. Wundt, towards the end of the 19th century, was led by his studies of social disorganisation to claim that organisation by the State can never be effectively substituted for that

voluntary collaboration in work and living which is the symptom of health in a society. When he said this he was considering not the adequacy of any political or social doctrine but the actual course followed by historical civilized development.

The successive creation of larger economic units by the coalescence or absorption of smaller units has enabled civilization to give its citizens greater material comfort; it has also, he says, destroyed individual significance in living for the majority of such citizens. 'What is a fact characteristic of our historic development is that it has successively destroyed all the ancient social backgrounds. One after another they have been banished either by the slow wearing of time or by violent revol-

ution, and in such a fashion that nothing has been developed to replace them. ... The France that was left coalescent after the Revolution, made the discovery, he says, that all the important secondary organization - secondary, that is, to the State - of its social life had been annihilated. He points out that only a solitary factor of collective organization has survived the torment - the political state. By the nature of things, since social life must be organized, there must emerge a tendency for the State to absorb into itself all organizing activity of a social character. The long result of our history is therefore that at the point of its

highest culmination the social order is annihilated and a solitary organizing activity, the political State, is left facing 'a disorganized dust of individuals'. But the State cannot organize effectively; it is centralized politically and geographically and consequently is always too remote morally and spatially to possess anything of the living reality of active collaboration for individuals. This actuality the secondary organizations of society need to possess. The State therefore finds its difficulties of control increase; simultaneously the individual, freed from all intimate social relationships, is abandoned to a disordered isolation and demoralized.

"These views are exaggerated, as are

have seen, nevertheless they are inter-
esting as defining one of the major
problems of our time which cannot
be successfully attacked by merely
political methods. . . . (Relate this
to groups & meditation & I. K. Jey)

[On R. H. Tawney's "Agricultural Society" the author says ^{Tawney} ~~the~~ is irrelevant in dealing particular groups, but "his curious belief that morality and religion are something more than specified aspects of a social life and organization"] "Actually the problem is not that of the richness of an agricultural society; it is that of the agriculturalness of a rich society. The agriculturalness he selects for such unsparring condemnation is itself no more than a symptom of the failing integration

| which invariably accompanies too rapid social change. [The element of defective money is the cause of the acquiescence & of much of the rapidity of social change. Okay.]

[He goes on to point out that Russia is moving her population around as fast as England & U.S. did & probably will get more results of disintegration.]

154

Anthropological studies show "that in a primitive community the logic of personal inter- relation in work and living operates much more systematically than with us. In such a society every tool or weapon, every ritual performance or magic and the whole kinship system is inexorably related to communal activity and function. ---

155

Members of the group live so completely

in the scheme and by it that they do not need to remember it; it has become the inevitable gestalt in terms of which they understand everything - to which they refer every experience for interpretation.

157. -- "The baby is unable to identify anything except as the stimulus of un-conditional or weakly conditioned response. He has to learn to select, from amongst the multiple items that offer, those stimuli or objects which, in some functional way, possess significance for him. In all his years of learning, the infant is incessantly aided in the establishment of necessary discrimination by the social milieu into which he is born. No one who has had any acquaintance with the personal

habits of neglected values can fail to recognize the unrealized gifts of control and response conferred upon the infant from his earliest weeks by an ordered social surrounding.

"Thus the reality of the infant's first knowledge is already a socio-reality. That is to say, his reality is informed and ordered by social conditioning to such an extent that for the rest of his life he is usually unable to complete his escape from the social interpretations thus imposed upon him. Only by the most arduous experimental study and logical elaboration can he win clear and socially untrammelled understanding. It is customary in these days to conceive social dependence as wholly a disadvantage. This con-

there is a striking
contrast to the condition
of the child.

denotation neglects the fact that the child and adolescent greatly need social support and sanction all during the entire period of tutelage. Without such tutelage and support the individual cannot achieve clear vision and knowledge. Alternative there is none; psychopathology has shown that infants unfortunately deprived of this social guidance grow up, the variants of circumstances to psychoneurosis ^{or} ~~and~~ crime. "---

157. "The human being is biologically unique in respect of his capacity for conserving and developing the conditioning effect upon him of his surroundings; in consequence of this capacity human functions are not identical at four years and

at forty. However apparent the identity of mental methods at different ages it must be distinguished; the organism's developed powers must be studied in relation to the stage of its development.

160 ~~"The method Piaget first employed~~
~~— he developed other methods later —~~
 (Child's soliloquies, official comments on what he is doing, monologues, 'egocentric' dialogue and imitative speech.)

"The word 'egocentricity', as Piaget uses it, must not be confused with our ordinary use of the adjective 'self-centred' as applied to the description of an adult. Piaget strongly repudiates the psy-
 161 chanalytic concept of 'narcissism' as an adequate description of infantile egocentricity for the very reason that it manifests this confusion. The child,

date to
series. also
no thought

up to the age of about seven years,
cannot think about himself in any
adult sense, because he has not elab-
orated sufficiently the distinction
between himself and the external
world or the distinction between his
thought and things — for him
there is no difference between logical
and causal relation. It is the
inability to discriminate these differ-
ences which makes the child's
thinking egocentric in the Piaget
sense; it is as if his organism were
continuous with the external
world, with no clear 'cut off' at
the organic periphery. He
cannot think of himself as clearly
distinct from other people and
things; so also in thinking of things

he is unable to be impersonal and objective, to distinguish them clearly from himself. A baby is as interested in his own hand and finger movements as in something the hand is holding; he is indifferent to the fine shades of the classification 'me' and 'not me'. One might perhaps generalize here by saying that the meanings a child gives to objects in the world about him are all meanings in terms of their use or other immediate relation to himself. This is, of course, an insufficient and oversimplified statement because it takes no account of the special character of childish logic.

"In his first volume Piaget had made use of Bleanche's (and Janet's) distinction between two kinds of thinking

- active and directed thinking and
passive or undirected thinking.

Directed thought is conscious of its
aim, intelligent, adapted to reality,
true or false, and communicable by
162 language. Undirected thought is un-
aware of its aim, not adapted to
reality, imaginative, does not critic-
ally establish truths but establish-
es relations and remains essentially
incommunicable. In the adult
the former has become concentration,
the latter reflection, but it is a
mistake to suppose that the child can
either concentrate or reflect as the
adult does. Since educational
systems at present concern them-
selves with mainly with fact and
logic, they usually do little

directly to help the individual to establish control of his thinking. In instances where an individual has not established such control it is his reflective thinking which, in effect, is out of hand. He feels that his reflections are uncontrolled, obsessive or compulsive, the 'undirected' character has become positive rather than merely passive. There is therefore a right relation between active thinking - sustained attention - and passive thinking - reverie - in the normal adult; by active thinking we learn to discriminate, by passive thinking we unify our experiences and reconsider our active discriminations. Piaget in his second volume quotes this observation of Janet and points out that the

use of whole words
in thinking.

Education

childish every sense to unify the
child's thinking although in a
manner quite unlike that of an adult
and ordered logic. In the introduction
to the third volume he says:
'The thought of the child approx-
imates more nearly to a totality of
attitudes seeing it once from action
and seeing then to the thought,
conscious of itself and representative, of
the adult'. The child does not think
as the adult since, his mental life
163 is rather to be described as an alterna-
tion of action and reverse - the
reverse occurring as a species of 're-
view comment' on action. 'Egocentric'
thinking proceeds immediately to sym-
thesis; things that co-exist in fact
are reported mentally as total-

ties. Almost any sort of connection is ^{thus} accepted and justified, without any thought of chance association. The identification of totalities and some sort of response must precede the development of controlled reflection, of skill, and of graduated response.

"One of the most interesting observations that is reported variously in all five of Piaget's published volumes is that the development of logical capacity proceeds step by step with the socialization of the child's thought. It is known that an adult of insufficient social experience will not be merely socially maladjusted; he will also be found to be using inferior logical techniques. Piaget makes it evident that a child has to acquire a capacity for making

the responses socially appropriate to different ^{situations} ~~cross-sections~~ before he can possibly understand either the responses or the situations. His first achieved code of social behavior is therefore somewhat suggestive of Pavlov's 'signal reflexes'. His responses are not, of course, mere reflexes, but they nevertheless are responses to signals rather than to situations. It is only as his social experience accumulates and his logical formulations are elaborated that he can possibly develop reasoned comprehension and independent judgment. But he cannot achieve this unless he continues to live in a sufficiently ordered and sufficiently stable

society. The psycho-analysts have
wisely observed the far-reaching effect
of a disordered social and family
environment upon a child's tempera-
mental stability and happiness.

104

Piaget's inquiries enable us to gain
some understanding of the mental
privations such an infancy implies.

"Piaget's researches seem to indi-
cate that even in a civilized com-
munity with an elaborate educa-
tional system the individual must
pass through a stage in which
he develops appropriate and ordered
responses to social signals without
any real capacity to understand or
judge social situations. Understand-
ing and adequate judgment are
acquired late and by many people

not always are
in relation to
intelligence

are not required at all, except within some limited area of achieved skill and logic. Generally speaking, therefore, the responses of any adult individual to his surroundings are of three types:

- (a) Logical. In this area he has developed skill and capacity for discrimination and independent judgment.
- (b) Non-logical. This type of response is described above as 'signal-response'. The individual's actions may be adequate to the situation, but any intelligence they exhibit is socially and not personally derived. This form of response is the effect of training in a social code of behavior.

(c) Irrational Non-logical response is typical of social adjustment. Irrational response, on the other hand, is symptomatic of social maladjustment and shows all the signs of obsession. Both types of response are rooted in individual unreason, but it is only the latter which technically interests the psychopathologist.

"The non-logical response, that, namely, which is in strict conformity with a 'social code', makes for social order and discipline, for effective collaboration in a restricted range of activity, and for happiness and a sense of security in the individual. It is specifically characteristic of primitive societies and of small and undeveloped com-

unities. This concentration of intelligence and decision in the group rather than the individual works exceedingly well, provided that the group does not have to face too many novel problems simultaneously, provided that it is not forced into a cultural clash with another group.

"The emotional response - the sign of shame and personal inadequacy - is not characteristic merely of individuals who have been brought up in a 'social void'. It appears also in any situation that is 'anonymous' in Durkheim's phrase. That is to say, when a code or tradition, that has been sufficiently adequate to its material problems and to its social controls, is faced with a situation that

it cannot meet, the individuals of the group will turn from non-logical to irrational action. They will lose their capacity for disciplined cooperation. This serves to complicate the problem further and may in extreme cases break the society.

"Here, then, is a crux of the modern situation. If a specialist group develops scientific knowledge and applies it to technical practice at too high a speed for general social adjustment to the change, one effect is to transform 'non-logical social organization into irrational social disorganization. This is especially true where the technical practice affects a group that is not party to the scientific knowledge. For example, engineering innovations have had a more disorganizing effect

upon industry than biochemical discoveries upon medicine. My colleague Warner has pointed out that industrial methods have been rapidly developed of late years in a logical or scientific direction, and internationally rather than nationally. The consequence is that the imposition of highly systematized industrial procedures upon all the civilized cultures has brought to relative annihilation the cultural traditions of work and craftsmanship. Simultaneously the development of a high labor mobility and a clash of cultures has seriously damaged the traditional routines of intimate and family life in the United States. Generally the effect has been to induce everywhere a

considerable degree of social disorganization; the comfortable non-logic of every social code has been reduced, at least in part, to irrational hysteria - without any prospect of development towards better understanding for the average citizen. It would seem that one of the important problems discovered by the research division at Hawthorne - the failure of workers and supervisors to understand their work and working conditions, the widespread sense of personal futility - is general to the civilized world and not merely characteristic of Chicago. The belief of the individual in his social function and solidarity with the group - his capacity for collaboration with ^{in work} the group - these

are disappearing, destroyed in part by rapid scientific and technical advance. With this belief his sense of security and of well being also vanishes and he begins to manifest those exaggerated demands of life which Durkheim has described. 'The stability and social health of any community, whether a tribe or a nation, however high or low in the scale of culture or complexity, may be reckoned by the degree of integration or disintegration it exhibits, and every weakening of the tribal tie destroys the social purpose of each member of it.'

107.

"No form of political action can ever substitute for this loss. Political action in a given community pre-

mines the desire and capacity of individuals to work together; the political function cannot operate in a community from which this capacity has disappeared. . . .

180. "A century of scientific development, the emergence of a considerable degree of social disorganization - these and certain effects of education have led us to forget how necessary this type of non-logical social action is to achievement and satisfaction in living. Before the present era, changes in method of living tended to come gradually, usually there was no sudden disruption of slowly evolved methods of working together. Even now one can witness in Europe the successful accomplishment of a necessary economic

duty as a purely social function, com-
parable with the ritual performances
of a primitive tribe. ---- In the
United States we have travelled rapidly
and carelessly from this type of
simple social and economic organ-
ization to a form of industrial organ-
ization which assumes that every
participant will be a devotee of
systematic economics and a rigid
logic. This unthinking assumption
does not 'work' with us, it does not
'work' in Russia; it has never
'worked' in the whole course of
human history. The industrial
worker, whether capable of it or no,
does not want to develop a black-
board logic which shall guide his
method of life and work. What

he wants is more nearly described as, first, a method of living in social relationships with other people and, second, as part of this an economic function for and value to the group. The whole of this most important aspect of human nature we have recklessly disregarded in our 'triumphant' industrial progress.

"In England, trade unionism no doubt came into being as a necessary defence of working class interests. But it developed for a time as an attempt to adapt and modernize social organization and the social code. As the tempo of industrial development became faster and the scientist and engineer - logicians both - established their grip of industrial

procedures the possibility of comprehension, or any element of control, by workers in the mass receded indefinitely. The trade union thus came to represent in many localities the very essence of conservative reaction - the resistance of a dying social code to innovation. There was nowhere amongst the administrative group a sufficient appreciation of the human values contained in a social code of behavior; so the battle between an attempt to conserve human values and economic innovation developed.

"In the United States changes finally came with such rapidity that any attempt to save the sociology of collaboration became futile.

It was as if one were to drill a regiment with a new set of commands and a new drill book every day. The result was not discipline and collaboration but disorder and reluctance. The rapid

152 pace of industrial development, uninformed by human research or knowledge, dispersed the last possibilities of collaborate and social effort and imposed upon the workers a low level of human organization from which social participation and social function were excluded. This low-level organization, like trade unionism, also represents a conservative and reactionary attempt to conserve human values; its chief ~~attempt~~ symptom is 'stalling', a procedure apparently resented as much by the

workers themselves as by management. Since this seems to be as characteristic of Russia as of the United States, it is probable that the human problems involved are fundamental and contain no 'political' element. Again it may be said that the question is not who is to control, but rather a question as to what resources are essential to the development of intelligence in control.

"Socialism, Communism, Marxism would seem to be irrelevant to the industrial events of the twentieth century. These doctrines probably express the workers' desire to recapture something of the lost human solidarity. Russian communism, however, although it claims this

purpose, seems to be expressive of twentieth-century methods rather than of an ideal human solidarity. The violent uprooting of peasants and workers to take them to a distant zone, the quick and final determination of disputes, are in part perhaps Slavonic and in part due to the critical nature of the present developmental phase. But the conceptions of work and industrial organization which such methods express are more nearly related to the engineering logic of the twentieth century than to Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat. ----

183 "The urgent problem of the present is that our administrative élite has become addict of a few specialist studies and has unduly discounted the human and

social aspects of industrial organization. The immediate need is to restore effective human collaboration; as a prerequisite of this, extension of the type of research I have reported is the major requirement. ---

184-5 (Although England has not lost its social cohesion as badly as the U.S.)--

"Yet the assumption that social codes anywhere, even in England, will continue to operate in their effective non-logical fashion is not justifiable.

The world over we are greatly in need of an administrative élite who can assess and handle the concrete difficulties of human collaboration. As we lose the non-logic of a social code we must substitute a logic of understanding. i) If at all the critical

ports in communal activity we had intelligent persons capable of analyzing an individual or group attitude in terms of, first the degree of logical understanding manifest; second, the non-logic of social codes in action; and third, the emotional exasperation symptomatic of conflict and of baffled effort; if we had an elite capable of such analysis, very many of our difficulties would dwindle to vanishing point.

Our leaders tend to state these problems in terms of systematic economics, and since the gravamen of the issue is human and social and not primarily economic their statements are not relevant. But no university in civilization offers any present aid to the discovery and learning of the issue.

administrator.

"In the field of international relations --- a similar situation exists. --- I see also attention is being given to tariffs, currencies, price level, to anything rather than the discovery of means whereby the business capacity to collaborate may be restored.

157. In a recently published book ('Our General Enemy, France' - Ray Long & R. R. Smith, NY) Mr. E. D. Schoonmaker says: 'Somewhere in France, to a degree unequalled in any other country, the unity of life has been preserved. And this unity has been achieved with no loss of variety. It is not a unity brought about by conformity, but by a unity of

elements held together by the ideal.
 The colors are there but there is also
 harmony ---'. This is a literary ex-
 pression, but it is descriptive of the
 fact that France, better than any
 other civilized country, has held her
 social integrity against the modern
 drive towards social disorganization.
 The writer further illustrates this by
 pointing to the unifying continuity
 of French foreign policy through ex-
 tensive changes of political organiza-
 tion during two hundred years.
 It is this tenacity of social integra-
 tion which gives the individual
 Frenchman his feeling of
 security and solidarity within his
 group. This tenacity of social ~~or~~
~~organization~~ integration is the only real

source of unity, 'confidence', and
'solidarity' for my people;-----

p. 11. "In organic processes", says Hen-
derson (L.J.), 'cause-and-effect analysis
is liable, in general, to erroneous con-
clusions. The only alternative is
mutual, dependence analysis which is,
in general, impossible without the
use of mathematics.' [L.J. Henderson, 'On
approximate Definition of Fact', Univ. of
Calif. Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XIV
Mar. 1932, p 183]. Living organism is
best conceived as a number of variables
in equilibrium with each other in
such a fashion that a change in
any one will induce changes
throughout the whole organization.
Biological experiment accordingly
should not seek to change a factor

a while keeping factors b c d --- n
 constant, for this is impossible. [Science, Feb 8, 1929, Raymond Pearl]
 factors b c d are put under constraint
 in a balanced system, the constraint
 will affect a also. For Henderson,
 scientific control in biological exper-
 iment means not constant but
 movement. The living organism
 responds to changes as a totality; in
 order to know the general nature of the
 response it is necessary to measure
 simultaneously as many specified
 variables as possible. ---

107. "There is one variety of psychoneurotic
 ill which by the evidence of all the
 schools of psychopathology seems to be
 unmistakably a mental ill - a trouble
 that originates in circumstance and
 defective education in the broadest

since. This is the affliction described as
obsession by the French school and as
compulsion neurosis by the Freudians.
It alone seems free from suspicion of
organic pathological complication as
hygiene and the psychoses are not.
It alone is clearly curable, in num-
erous instances, by re-education or
psychological 'analysis'. The chief
character of this complaint is
described by both the above-quoted
terms, the individual is unable to
control his affective thinking -
he is 'obsessed' by certain ideas which
seem to him to have a 'compulsive'
power of establishing themselves in
his preoccupations even though he
believes such ideas to be irrational
or untrue. In extreme cases the

mental ill is serious; in a milder form the trouble penetrates the whole fabric of our civilization and probably constitutes the chief mental disability of our time. ----

109. "The French school, especially its founder and chief exponent, Pierre Janet, is chiefly interested in the manner of obsessive thinking; the German school is interested in what the obsessive is thinking about and how he came to think it. ----

155. "There is an interesting observation to be made here, which Tawney does not introduce into his discussion of a functional society. In these primitive communities there is room for an individual to develop skill, but there is no latitude for the development of

radical or intelligent opinions. If he
develops special powers in hunting
or war he gains mana and reputa-
tion; but he is not expected to
develop any intelligent thinking
156. about the details of social organ-
ization. The unit is, in a sense, the
group or commune, and not the
separate individuals; the develop-
ment of anything in the nature of
personal capacity must be subordinate
to the whole. With us it is quite
otherwise; the intent of education in
a complex society is to develop
intelligence and independence of judg-
ment in the individual. The primi-
tive community develops a social
intelligence and not individual intelli-
gence. Over almost the entire area

of a man's life the society thinks for him; and he learns only the social responses he must produce in reply to given signals. This is a very restricted method of living, but it is highly integrate and 'functional'; in addition to this it is very comfortable for the individual, who does not need to 'wrestle with a solitary problem'.

----- "Our educational systems are elaborated as if intended to develop intelligent and independent judgment over the whole system of individual living, but educational authorities have to recognize that the total number of persons who can even approximate to this ideal is very small, and that even these few, by reason of the demands of their

the number of individuals who are not so much interested in the social life as they are in the individual life, is very small, and that even these few, by reason of the demands of their

special studies upon their time and energy, are compelled to accept the judgment of society in most matters. The advantage of education is that it gives the individual a technique of inquiry such that he is able to re-order his thought and action in any direction, if revision should become necessary; for the vast, most of us must live, more or less by the social code. Since such dependence

157. or independence of judgment as we possess is derived from social training and education, a question as to the method of its derivation becomes important. " — —

The principle of division of labor has now been superseded by automatic machinery. \therefore This principle need no longer be clung to for sake of increasing production, and as a sign of technical advance. It is the automatic machinery. \therefore For the unemployed & the intellectuals we may consider K on its own merits, regardless of that principle of div. of labor.

If you go in for violence these days you have to pay for the expensive weapons. So you ~~penalize~~ ~~you~~ and impoverish you and penalize yourself ~~visibly~~ in advance (formerly the impoverishment & penalization was only spiritual and mental). In case of a nation, this means that the nation most willing to impoverish the most

mass of citizens for the sake of winning
by violence and threats of violence can
compel all others who accept the phil-
osophy of violence to follow her water.
So now England must become a dictator-
ship and become as impoverished as
Germany. America will follow suit.

Only people who break away from both
the philosophy of violence and the love of
money possessions can get clear of pro-
gressive degeneracy and degradation and suffer-
ing. By taking the slight suffering of
voluntary poverty, we avoid the much
greater suffering of being deprived forcibly
of what we value. It is like a corporation
willing to voluntarily contain things it
formerly counted as assets.

Quoted from John Morley "On Compromise"
London, Macmillan 1886.

120-121 "What we think has a prodigiously close connection with what we are. The consciousness of having reflected seriously and conclusively on important questions, whether social or spiritual, augments dignity while it does not lessen humility. In this sense, taking thought can and does add a culcit to our stature. Opinions which we may not feel bound or even permitted to press on other people, are not the less power for being latent. They shape ideals, and it is ideals that inspire conduct. ... Finally, unless a man follows out ideas to their full conclusion without fear what the conclusion may be, whether he thinks it expedient to

make his thought and goal fully
known or not, it is impossible that he
should acquire a commanding grasp
of principles. And a commanding
grasp of principles, whether they are
public or not, is at the very root of
coherency of character. It raises
mediocrity near to a level with the
highest talents, if these talents are
in company with a disposition that
allows the little gradience of the
home incessantly to obscure the
persistent laws of things. ---

chap. I 238 --- [The flinching from ~~dealing~~
& making one's opinions] "We lose not
only the possible advantage of the given
change. Besides that, we lose also the
certain advantage of maintaining or
increasing the amount of conventionalities

in the world. And everybody can conceive the loss incurred in a society where diminution of the latter sort takes place. The advance of the community depends not merely on the improvement and elevation of its moral maxims, but also on the quickening of moral sensibility. The latter work has mostly been effected, when it has been effected on a large scale, by teachers of a certain singular personal quality. They do nothing to improve the theory of conduct, but they have the art of stimulating men to a more enthusiastic willingness to live in daily practice to the requirements of whatever theory they may accept. The love of virtue, of duty, of holiness, or by whatever name we call this powerful sentiment, exists in the

Re going to the
Garden

majority of men, where it exists at all,
independently of argument. It is a
matter of affection, sympathy, association,
aspiration. Hence, even while, in
quality, sense of duty is a stationary
factor, it is constantly changing in
quantity. The amount of conscience
in different communities, or in the
same community at different times,
varies infinitely. The immediate
cause of the decline of a society in
the order of morals is a decline
in the quantity of its conscience,
a deadening of its moral sensitiv-
ness, and not a depravation of
its theoretical ethics. The Greeks
became corrupt and infatuated,
not for lack of ethical science,
but through the decay in the

9
 numbers of those who were actually
 alive to the validity and force of ethical
 obligations. Mahomedans triumphed
 over Christians in the East and in Spain
 - if we may for a moment isolate
 moral conditions from the rest of the
 total circumstances - not because their
 scheme of duty was more elevated or
 comprehensive, but because their
 respect for duty was more strenuous
 and firm.

of Believing

"The great importance of leaving
 this powerless element in a community
 239 as free, as keen, and as active as
 possible, is overlooked by the thinkers
 who uphold coercion against liberty,
 as a saving social principle. Every
 act of coercion directed against an
 opinion or a way of living is in so

6
far calculated to lessen the quantity of
conscience in the society where such
acts are practiced. Of course, where
ways of living interfere with the
lawful rights of others, where they
are not strictly self-regarding in all
their details, it is necessary to force
the dissidents, however strong may be
their conscientious sentiment. The
evil of attenuating that sentiment
is smaller than the evil of allow-
ing one set of persons to realize
their own notions of happiness,
at the expense of all the rest of
the world. But where those
notions can be realized without
unlawful interference of third
kind, then the forcible hindrance
of such realization is a direct

9 weakening of the force and amount of
 conscience on which the community ^{may}
 count. There is one memorable historic
 case to illustrate this. Series XIV, in
 revoking the Edict of Nantes, and the
 author of the still more cruel law of
 1724, not only violently drove out
 multitudes of the most scrupulous
 part of the French nation; ^{he} they vir-
 tually offered the most tremendous
 bribe to those of less clear resolu-
 tion, to ~~foreign~~ ^{foreign} conversion to the
 orthodox faith. This was to treat
 conscience as a thing of mean value.
 It was to scatter to the wind with
 both hands the moral resources of
 the community. And who can
 fail to see the strength which
 would have been given to France

her home of storm, a hundred years
after the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes, of her protestant sons,
fortified by the training in the
habits of individual responsibility
which protestantism involves, had
only been there to aid?"

[Other valuable pp in the book are
148, 165, 166, 110-11, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218,
219, 229 - 30]

Re my idea of love as a senti-
ment & that by cultivating the idea
elements in a sentiment the emotions
appropriate come along automatically,
it is interesting that Jesus commanded
people to change their minds, repent,
and obedience. They were to do it themselves,
not wait for God to do it for them. of meditation

Quotes from "What I Believe" by J. D. Balfour. Wm Heinemann Ltd. London 1938

61. "Does not everyone know from experience that it is impossible to convert an opponent by argument unless we can get him to abandon his premises and adopt our own, - an arduous and usually an impossible undertaking?"

63. "... Returning now to the reliability of scientific truth as a basis for our beliefs in the nature of man, we see that what the inductive process does is to provide us with new premises. Having done that, the process loses its usefulness. Once the hypothesis is stated, the reverse process begins and search is made for further evidence to uphold it, the final justification of the new hypothesis added to our knowledge of natural causes.

Q and laws being that it should satisfy every possible test that can be applied to it. "...

68 - 68--- The intelligence can no more abandon reason and continue to function, than the body can abandon the use of the heart and continue to live. It has been admitted that the reason is a reliable apparatus within its own limitations; but those limitations impose the assumption that the reason is a secondary process in the distillation of thought, because it must have material to work upon and the selection of the material is primarily influenced by another element in the personality. Reason it is true, will reject some material that is presented to it and to that

Q. "It is a power of choice, but it cannot go out into the invisible to discover new material for it to work upon. -- It may aid but not direct us." --

136-137, --- "That which is called the Christian religion existed among the ancients, and never did not exist, from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh, at which time the true religion which already existed began to be called Christianity." [St. Augustine, Epist. Petros. Book I.] " --

143, --- "The principles that underlie Christ's teachings.

"Suggestions of them are found in such sayings as 'The Kingdom of God is within you'; 'Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect'; 'Greater works than these shall ye do';

3
'Your body is the temple of the
Holy ghost;' the last of them, only,
from St. Paul. There can be but
one deduction from these passages
and the angels and saints have
done something to prove the truth
of it. It is, let everyone say it for
himself or herself: 'I have within
me all the potentialities of the
omniscient, omnipotent and omni-
present. I am not a part of God
or a member of His Church, for
God has neither parts nor mem-
bers. If his centre is everywhere,
I am that centre.' Then, lest
that affirmation carry with it
a sense of arrogance or a lust
for power, remember always the
essential contingent; which is

That every other human being on this earth has the right to make a precisely similar claim. To deny another's claim is to relinquish our own. Thus we touch the extremes of pride and humility; of pride in the knowledge that all things are possible to us, of humility in the recognition that in this particular, all men are equal.

In this understanding, pride and humility will cease to be opposites.

For how shall we have a personal pride in that which is common to all, or find cause for humility in our oneness ~~is~~ with every living thing?

144

I deem, pride and humility are both human, temporal qualities and God can feel neither the one nor the other.

"For the same reason, the full

realization of knowledge of our godhead
would resolve the antinomies of good
and evil which are no more than
aspects of separation. This con-
firmation is foreshadowed in the
saying that the promised Comforter
will 'expose the world of sin, and
of righteousness, and of judgment.'
[St. John XVI, 8] (The last term is
consequent upon the other two, for
where there is neither sin nor right-
eousness there can be no judgment
between them, but it gives added
force to the intention of the two
important categories.) The nature
of this text excludes the false
substitution of 'self-righteousness'
offered by some exegesis in
order to fit the text to our

temporal moral code. Self-righteous-
 ness is but one of a host of petty
 human weaknesses, and no fit
 antithesis for so majestic a category
 as sin. Moreover, if we read the
 preceding verses in the sense here
 suggested, we may wisely interpret
 them to uphold this contention
 without laying ourselves open to the
 charge of adapting them for a partic-
 ular purpose. Thus 'of sin because
 they believe not on me,' needs no ex-
 planation here, for the 'me' of that
 sentence represents a universal which
 will occupy our attention later. 'Of
 righteousness because I go to my Father
 and ye see me no more,' that is to say
 that the principle of goodness will
 be merged in the One, and such

relations as Sin and Righteousness will be no longer valid. And the judgment of 'the prince of this world' must refer to that final settlement in which all the object-ive apparitions of temporal life will vanish away. ---

~~157~~ 156. ... "Set us ... proceed to examine the more reasonable method of substituting wish for will in the earliest stages of our quest. That wish, first formulated in the mind, has many aspects, and its force and determination will vary according to the extent to which it is a true expression of the soul. In its simplest aspect it may appear as a leaning towards an universal charity, a readiness to find good rather than

evil in the world about us, the desire
 to be at peace with life by obeying
 the injunction of the unknown purpose,
 that occasionally prompts us to action.
 Most people are aware of that leaning
 intermittently, and know the satisfaction,
 the sense of inward applause,
 that follows the expression of the
 will in an act of self-denial.
 But weeks, months, even years may
 elapse before the conditions are
 favourable for another revelation of
 the inward will, and to wait in
 placid hopefulness for its return is
 the way of futility. It is better
 to resist the impulse than to do
 nothing. Sometimes when the
 impulse is a powerful one, resistance
 may quicken its demands, for the

Paradox

157

act of resistance is in itself an acknowledgment of the soul's energy, a recognition of its power. But these are the few who are ripe for development, although they, too, may fail to reach that self-knowledge described as soul wisdom.

"The many must find another way; and that under consideration is the way of ~~the~~ mind. When that impulse comes, then, it must not be neglected and the thought of its return relegated to the impotent realm of phantasy. It must be recognized in the mind as an activity of the spirit, and worshipped not as a function of the self but as an expression of immortality. Its renewal must be

8 / ardently longed for until that
 longing is greater than any other, for
 only by desire can we conquer desire.
 And since on this temporal plane of
 being we are continually beset by
 illusion, we must find reality in
 action, and let the leaning towards
 an universal charity find expression,
 even although at first it appears
 forced and mechanical. We learn
 to give by the practice of giving,
 and if that longing for soul-wisdom
 remains constantly in the mind,
 we may learn in time to give
 spontaneously, without afterthought,
 with no least desire for any kind
 of return, whether it be the grati-
 tude of the recipient, or our own
 self-approval. For there is no time

9
virtue in any act that is performed in the expectation of a reward, not even if that reward be the promise of eternal life.

158 "It is manifest, therefore, that the prevailing wish we have so ardently to cultivate should be pure from the outset. It must not before all things be the wish to save our own souls. The saying 'whoever will save his life shall lose it,' quoted in the same words in all three of the synoptic Gospels, is one of the greatest of the great eternal truths, and the 'life' referred to, is not, of course, that of this temporary pattern the body, but its immortal, animating principle. The wish to save one's soul,

consequence
to the beginning

in fact, is nothing but a disguised form of self-seeking, of egoism, a transmutation of the desire for bodily immortality. It cannot be the expression of the soul's will, since the ^{eternal} (soul) is of its nature immortal.

"The means to overcome this self-centredness is offered in the universal allegories of self-abasement through worship. Worship, adoration, love, all prevent the ideal of submergence in the absolute, by exaltation of the spirit and contempt for its fugitive instrument the body. And the work that springs from the recognition of the eternal spirit working through its temporary expression must be founded on worship. In the beginning the desire for

holiness is displayed in humility, and
in the desire to serve the eternal
purpose at whatever physical incon-
venience. All religions preach this
gospel, for all religions contain an
element of truth. Where they fail
is in the interpretation of the eternal
purpose by its personification in an
allegorical image, a method which
inevitably induces a shelling of
personal responsibility, coupled with
the hope of reward, most prominently
God's approval. This worship falls
back into phantasy, into the eleva-
tion of temporal images that are
but the pale shadows of reality,
into the imitation that induces
the conception of the persona,
which obscures our knowledge of

the true self.

" Instead of objectifying that which we worship, we should desire to be it. We have to ~~find~~ seek first 'the Kingdom of God' within us through our realization of it. The faith that was described in an earlier chapter must be extended to this third element of true man and centre there, until we know with a certainty greater than we can have of all objective life, the reality of our own spirit. This spirit is the 'I' of all Christ's teaching and may be substituted in those passages in which the personal pronoun appears, as the supreme object of faith. To take but a single instance, 'Whosoever believeth in Him shall have everlasting life' (of ^{forever} ~~eternity~~).

misquoted from John III, 16] is not a
promise but a statement of fact.
For those who are able to realize
their oneness with the spirit while
they are still in the flesh will know
their immortality before the incident
of physical death. And this
synthesis of the wish to be at one
with all life is the end of desire,
as we know it, - another allegory of
the apparent paradox that the
object is itself the means, and
that once the object is realized
in the means, they pass beyond
our understanding and cease to be
definable in language though they
may be known in the imagination.

Another version of the paradox
involving the identification of the path

with the goal, is to be found in the command to love our neighbors, our enemies, [Matthew V, 43-44], one another [John XV, 12], the Lord our God, with mind, heart and soul [Luke XXII, 37]. This is indeed a command of perfection, for if any man could truly obey that command, nothing further could be required of him. But no-one can love to order, and more especially not to the order of his own mind, though it is possible to assume such an appearance of loving as will successfully deceive the world. No would I disparage the effort that leads to such an appearance. ----

"And although we may deceive the world by this continued effort after kindness, indiscriminating generosity,

Somewhat
an
emotion
N.B. 1.

a tenderness for everything that has life, we cannot deceive ourselves. Consider the love we have for those who are nearest to our hearts. Is there no shadow of criticism in it, no wish to shape them to the pattern that is our personal ideal of perfection, no longing for return, even to the full measure of our own gift? If there is any such criticism, wish or longing we may know that our love is human and not spiritual. It is a love that needs some return in kind, either from the loved one or in our own personal self-approval. Absolute love represents the complete immolation of the self, the end of all personal desire.

But, as in the realization of the spirit that makes us one with all life, all contradictions are resolved, and we become that which we seek, the pathway and the goal.

"But if we cannot learn this kind of love by any adherence to principle or instructions of the mind, the gift is ours if we can find it in our own spirits. We shall know it, as we know any other impulse of the soul - wisdom that all too rarely manifests itself in our consciousness, by its spontaneity and its all-embracingness. It may be only a passing realization of profound pity, of the unselfish desire to help another, but if it is recognized for what it is and the longing ~~is~~

for its return runs in the mind,
it will come again. We have
the power to encourage or to reject
it, as we have the power to
encourage or reject any other evi-
dence of our immortality through
faith in faith and the love of
love, since the means and the
object are one.

"Capitalism in Crisis" by James
Harvey Rogers - Yale Univ Press,
1938. He names 6 dangers to capital-
ism ^{or one} tendencies "which if not corrected
^{or compensated} will ruin it. (1) holding prices and
(unemployment) closing factories, (2) saving and hoarding
(i.e. saving & spending)
(3) insistence on an annual budget balance,
(4) fear of inflation (5) fighting between
government and business (6) state autocracy.

My money reform would handle most of these.
 p. 125. "Many people in the United States
 still labor under the illusion that totalitarian-
 ism, under whatever name it may
 appear, is a consciously adopted policy.
 Nothing could be further from the
 truth.

179. "In the totalitarian countries, the econ-
 omic machinery has been kept running.
 The goal is to keep at a maximum the
 total real income of the state. Hence
 alienation of any considerable portion of
 the instruments of production is
 avoided. The mere concept of the
 state as an entity superior to the
 individuals that constitute it has
 made such a policy almost in-
 evitable.

"In the capitalist states, on the

country, where the democratic tradition continues, the economic good of the individual is still theoretically dominant. The organization of economic activities, as heretofore, rests on the private initiative of each individual seeking his own economic good. Under this once extremely effective system, as we have seen, large and growing sections of our productive facilities are now being closed down for long and increasingly periods of time. With each closing down, too, a larger and increasing proportion of the people find their economic security more tenuous; and at the same time the total national real income is reduced.

6 "The competition of the two systems is real and actual. In the totalitarian states, there is no little concern for the long future. Well do their leaders realize how great has been the stimulus of private profit to the continued development and use of new and improved devices. Indeed, some of them have sought diligently to retain this stimulus. Still they have not been reassured by the relative qualities of their products when compared with those of the capitalist countries.

"Whatever the long-run superiority of capitalism may be, however, its survival or failure will be determined largely by short-run considerations. As I read the public reactions, the

demand for economic security is becoming with many people almost a mania. Whole groups of the American population, for the first time in many years, are experiencing the distracting and painful uncertainties of widely fluctuating and frequently disappearing incomes; and many are apparently ready to sacrifice much of their economic and political liberty in order to rid themselves of so distracting an evil.

"If totalitarianism comes to the United States, it will have as its avowed aim the re-establishment of economic security and the elimination of present losses from the failure to utilize effect-

ively on economic resources

"If on the other hand, capitalism is to be preserved, it must accomplish to a reasonable degree the same ends. . . .

"The rank and file of business classes, like the rank and file of other classes, will not get much excited about changes in substance - if only you will continue the conventional forms unchanged." For example

the money reform
the pattern

He points out that unemployment leads to trade restrictions & eventually autarky. Also -

166. "The major obstacle to international dealings - that of military self-sufficiency - is in many countries insurmountable, at least for the predictable future. Fortunately, in

Q many parts of the world, economically of preponderant importance, this particular obstacle is absent. Once the economic influences behind trade restrictions are removed, free trade relations among the very numerous non-imperial countries can be developed with the resulting rehabilitation of their economic structure and of their standards of living.

157

"The spreading of the Ford price and production policies to the rest of American industry would largely eliminate one of the chief problems of monopoly in the United States and would thereby remove one of the most formidable obstacles to the satisfactory

functioning of the capitalist.

"In the absence of a concerted move in this direction, there appears but one alternative policy for removing this major obstacle to the free functioning of our economic order. It is a disagreeable one. . . .

"When high monopoly profit per unit of profit is taken, such profit, instead of going back promptly into the incomes of the public, frequently, ~~even~~ especially as in recent years - lags in the idle balances of the producing corporations. If the capitalist system as a whole is to be kept in operation, the accumulation of such profits can be justified only if they are again spent promptly by the

4
accumulating corporations, to hold them idle (in deprecious) is to create an exactly equivalent shortage of purchasing power in the hands of the public. The painful alternative proposal therefore - and

158
it is basic, if the wheels of industry are to be kept turning - is for the government to take away a very large proportion of all business profits that are undistributed or uninvested.

"To dismiss such bold alternative proposals as 'radical', or to refuse to consider them calmly, is merely to avoid looking at things as they are in the capitalist world. That they are included in otherwise means

Q system elsewhere is beside the point. ---

153. "It is of the nature of economic anarchy, internal and national, that it arises from the widespread existence of unemployed resources. At a time when men are out of work it seems almost tantamount to Britons to buy American automobiles, --- The solution of economic anarchy will be politically more feasible when steps have already been taken to solve our unemployment problem. --- The failure of capitalism to make use of available resources has thus tended to destroy a basic condition for its survival - free trade at least within our own boundaries.

2 I agree with Rogers & feel that his studies will probably not be soon enough or enough in amt adopted to save capitalism. So totalitarianism will come to all industrialized countries, plus destruction. This will last till the populations drop heavily. Breakdown of militarism may come; also of ~~city~~ ^{high} life, big cities.

India under Pagan's program has the best chance economically as well as socially. Village production & culture can be revived. Religion ~~move~~. Militarism, after Dr. Ganes, will not take control. Spread of Satyagraha & national unity.

CAPITALISM IN CRISIS. By James Harvey Rogers. 210 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press. \$2.50.

By ELLIOTT V. BELL

THE chief function of an economic system is to provide a livelihood for the population. In recent years the system of "free enterprise" has fallen down in this respect. There has resulted an acceleration of the gradual but persistent drift toward "State capitalism" that had been going on for seventy-five years. "State capitalism" means the concentration of economic powers in the hands of government instead of individuals. The Nazi, Fascist and Communist States are all examples. In our own country the demand for economic security is becoming with many people almost a mania.

Such is the crisis that confronts capitalism, as Professor Rogers sets it forth. He recalls how, in the last big depression, the demand for government action, even from the conservative agrarian sections of the population, was strong enough to have permitted the government at the time of the banking holiday to have nationalized the banks. He predicts that if conditions of equal economic stress arise in the near future important steps in the direction of nationalizing our economic life will be taken; and hence the part left to private initiative will be correspondingly reduced.

Starting with this general premise, Professor Rogers examines six ailments of our existing system—namely, rigidity of prices, oversaving, chaotic and misunderstood budget policies, the fear of inflation, the bitterness between business and government, and the tendency toward "autarchic" action on the part of various States in the form of discriminatory taxes against trucks and goods entering from other States. Should no cure be

found for these ailments, he says, "American capitalism is probably doomed."

Apart from the mere suggestions that business should cease to follow rigid price policies, that business and government should cease fighting each other, and that Federal legislation should be directed against the autarchic tendencies in the States, Professor Rogers's chief remedy for the ills he describes is the use of budgetary deficits and surpluses as a means of "controlling depressions and unhealthy booms."

He proposes that "the budget should be made to balance over a reasonable period of years (never more than ten) and that within the period the amount of the deficit or of the surplus be determined largely by considering economic conditions." From a purely theoretical standpoint this is, of course, a perfectly reasonable suggestion. Practically it is hard to see what good would be accomplished. The current fiscal year is the ninth successive year of deficits. Professor Rogers's ten-year balancing program would call for action in fiscal 1940 to overcome the accumulated deficit of the past nine years. The point is, of course, that it is easy to get Congress to vote spending programs, but hard to get economies and high taxes voted. The notion of deflationary budget surpluses in good times is splendid, but in practice even our most conservative citizens would tend to balk at a taxation program deliberately designed to put a damper on prosperity.

Brandonin "Suggestion & Autosuggestion"
N.Y. Dodd Mead & Co 1921 (London Allen & Unwin?)

Two phases in suggestion

- p. 187 "1. An idea, imposed by the operator, is accepted by the subject.
2. This idea undergoes transformation within the subject into the corresponding reality. --- i.e.

1. acceptance

2. The ideoreflex process (which, for us, is suggestion) ---

188. --- "What is acceptation? --- acceptation must not be looked upon as an act of conscious and deliberate will. --- The term 'acceptation' connotes the notion that the idea penetrates the mind in virtue of a consent which in other cases might be withheld; that the will and the

intelligence are in ~~abeyance~~; that the idea is not consciously controlled, but is the object of a spontaneous desire. In a word, it is not the conscious but the subconscious which accepts the idea, instead of being confronted with others and judged from an intellectual and volitional viewpoint, is granted hospitality like a welcome stranger. It remains isolated, and therefore is not subject to contradiction. [i.e. not subject to law of reversed effort Rosq.]

"We may speak of acceptance, not only in heterosuggestion, but also in spontaneous autosuggestion". [If this is relation to Crowley's idea of identification as an element in willing. Rosq.] - - -

310. Since children are so suggestible he advocates deliberate teaching them to use it ~~to the~~ in schools. "I would go further

and say that auto-suggestion ought to
take a primary place in education.
For by its use, not merely will the
child learn self-control, not merely
will he develop his physical energies
and be helped to resist disease, but
in addition he will be able to develop
(in a degree hardly conceivable by
those who have not seen the method
applied) his working powers in all
fields. He will learn how to obtain
the maximum of results with a
minimum of effort. -- In spirit
he will learn to like his work. --
develops ~~many~~ attention, interest, enthusiasm
and inclination to efforts. "

Ch. E. p. 134 et seq. 1. Saw of Concentrated
Attention, 2. Saw of Auxiliary Motion,
3. Saw of physical Effort.

P137 Law of Reversed Effort. "When an idea imposes itself on the mind to make an effort as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion."

4. Law of subconscious teleology. "When the end has been suggested the subconscious finds means for its realization."

But ^{conscious} concentration of attention brings in the law of reversed effort, because it requires neutralizing & throwing out the previous suggestions already in the mind. We can, by music, create

Q the needed amplifying emotion when
needed. By relaxation & self-
suggestion we can reduce the
friction of the ~~new~~ ^{new} idea. Instead of voluntary atten-
tion we let the subconscious ^{also opposed} crop
out by ^{of inhibition & suggestion} relaxation. [Relate
this to meditation. Key] Use
reflective ~~by~~ autosuggestion after
relaxing. Such relaxation, muscular,
attention & inhibitive, prevails in
sleep, reverie & hypnosis; — time
when suggestion works best.

[The relaxed condition of the
opponent caused by the superficial
primacy of the N.V.C., conduces to
reflective suggestion in the opponent
& to autosuggestion & acceptance of
the N.V.C. in himself, Key]

145. " Voluntary effort ~~is~~ essentially
presupposes the idea of a resistance to
be overcome. It comprises both

146 action and reaction. ... If, then, (and
this is a matter of the first importance),
I concentrate voluntary attention on an
idea, which implies my making an
effort, I am simultaneously conscious
of an action towards this idea, and
of a resistance in consequence of which
the idea continually tends to escape me,
so that I must unceasingly recall
my wandering attention. ... In the
effort of voluntarily attending to an
idea, our consciousness embraces at
one and the same time thought
and non-thought; or, let us say,
our state of mind gathers, on the
one hand, the idea, and, on the other

Q

kind, the sentence which this idea
has to bring thought

"In these circumstances, we do not
think a single idea, but two conflicting
ideas. And if our state of consciousness
is sufficiently reinforced by attention
for the origination of a suggestion to
be possible, it is not a single
suggestion that will result, but
there will be two conflicting sug-
gestions, which will neutralise one
another more or less perfectly. The
yield, therefore, will be far less copious
than in the case of spontaneous
suggestion. . . .

148 [Cox's formula]

"When the will and the imagination
are at war, the imagination invariably
gains the day.

Q. "In the conflict between the will and the imagination, the force of the imagination is in direct ratio to the square of the will [i.e. is immensely more powerful]

"This law of reversed effort, revealed in its full power when the subject has to strive against a prior suggestion, is not peculiar to such instances. It operates in all suggestions wherein effort of will is the leading factor. As we have just explained, it is an outcome of the very nature of effort. ... [P. who fails after saying 'I took a lot of effort'. But here is his very error] --

"Coné, therefore, has the best of reasons for drawing the following conclusions:

"Above all, the will must not intervene in the practice of autosuggestion. This

Q 147

education is absolutely central.
"And a little further on he writes:
" "This observation is of capital im-
portance. It explains why we get
such unsatisfactory results, in the
treatment of moral disorders, when
we aim at the re-education of
the will. What we have to
work for is the education of the
imagination."

The law of unwind effort. The
outcropping of the subconscious; relax-
tion. Education of the outcropping;
collection. A psychological sym-
ptom for attention; contention.

By collection he means such
things as fairy tales, artistic education.
By contention he means attention minus
effort; Simultaneous attention & relax-

tion. As just before going to sleep

Since patterns of action would
 come as indirect suggestions, & the use of
 tools & symbols would create acceptance.
 Relate all this to your ideas for
 prayer, to forms & old, to meditation
 to use of music, to use in training.

Quotes from article by A. K. Coomans-
 anway.

"Medieval Aesthetics" II St Thomas Aquinas on
 Dionysius. Quoted from The Art Bulletin, Vol XX,
 1938. College Art Assoc. U. of Chicago.

p. 68. note 5. --- "The superiority of contempla-
 tion, perfected in raptus (St. sermone), to
 action is assumed, which is indeed the ortho-
 dox point of view, consistently maintained in
 universal tradition and by no means only

Q (as sometimes assumed) in the Orient,
however it may have been observed by the
moralistic tendencies of modern European
religious philosophy. The scholastic
treatment of 'beauty' as an essential
name of God exactly parallels that of
the Hindu school in which 'aesthetic
is experience' (rasavādana, lit. 'the
tasting of flavor') is called the very
thing of the 'tasting of God' (brahmān-
vādana). A clear distinction of aesthetic
experience from aesthetic pleasure is
involved; 'tasting' is not a 'matter of
taste' (5th. tat lagnam hi, 'what sticks
to the heart'). Just as 'with finding
God, all progress ends' (Reliant),
so in perfect aesthetic experience the
operation of the attracting power of
beauty -- aesthetic pleasure is distinct.

from the 'rapture' of aesthetic contemplation
 - is it an end. If action ensues, when
 the contemplation returns to the plane
 of conduct, as is inevitable, this will
 neither add to nor detract from the
 higher 'value' of the contemplative ex-
 perience. On the other hand, the
 action itself will be really, although
 not necessarily perceptibly, of another
 sort than before, as being now a
 manifestation, rather than motivated; in
 other words, whereas the individual
 may previously have acted or striven to
 act according to a concept of 'duty'
 (or more technically stated 'prudently'),
 and as it were against himself,
 he will now be acting spontaneously
 (Shri. ~~also~~ sahaja) and as it were of
 himself (or as St. Thomas is grandly

expressed it, 'the perfect cause acts for the love of what it has', and Edelhart, 'willingly but not from will'); it is in this sense that 'Jana was all virtue, because he acted from impulse and not from rules' (Blake). It surely needs to be said that the self-confidence of 'genius' is far removed from the 'spontaneity' of referred to here; our spontaneity is rather that of the workman who is 'in full possession of his art', which may or may not be the case of 'genius'.

From his "A Study of the Katha Upanishad (IV, I)" Indian Historical Quarterly Vol XI, 1935 (Calcutta District Press, 7, Panduraman Ghose Lane, Calcutta) Note 2 p. 570. "Pratyakṣam" Pratyakṣam

ātman might also be rendered 'exemplified Essence', cf. RV. III, 48, 3, where Indra is pūndra pratibala, 'multiply exemplified', and for patyagata in the sense 'presented', 'brought forward', etc. -----

"Essence (ātman) is that by which a thing is, name or form (nāma), that by which it is what it is; aspect, phenomenon (rūpa), that by which we perceive it as it is.

"The ātman, literally 'spirit', considered (1) as deaspirated is 'That One' who anāt avātā, RV, X, 129, 2, the jīvanāt --- apīrānāt of Mund. Up II, 1, 2, the abhyāsa Parasā of KU, VI, 5, and South who calls ātmanvi agā in BU, I, 4, 1, the state of deaspiration (virvāna) being in Buddhism similarly anatta, (2) as actually spirit is the

Breath of Life, prāṇa (Hebrew, ruah,
Aralia, ruḥ, Chinese ch'i, Greek
pneuma, Latin spiritus, English ghost),
and 3) as the Begotten is made manifest
(Bk, I, 5, 1, 'The Father is manas, the
mother vāc, the Begotten prāṇa').
Expressed in Christian terms, the Father,
Son and Holy Ghost are consubstantial,
but there is a distinction, inasmuch as
in the Hindu formulation the three
Persons of the Trinity are Father, Mother,
and Begotten, and though the Spoken
Spiritus or Essence is the link between
them, it is not always referred to as
a distinct Person or hypostasis.

p. 575. note 9. "The outward life thus en-
circled by the diemone (prajā-kāmya)
individuality as 'good', involves for the
creature an experience of both good and

evil; just as in Genesis, when Adam eats of the tree, the inevitable consequence is that of expulsion from Paradise into the outer world conditioned by pleasure and pain as opposites, "good and bad ... a thing that has no place in real being" (Elihu, 1, 207). It is after the name (leha) of the place of their origin that good and evil as actually known to the creature are called su-leha and duh-leha; which is just as if, with Genesis in mind, we spoke of pleasure and pain as sweet and bitter 'finite' respectively. ...

p. 579. ... "It is then a fundamental error to assume that either Veda or Vedanta regards the world as a mistake: what is asserted is that in so far as its parts or principles are separately envisaged and not in their integrity under specific determinations as God

are in themselves, not that of things as they are in fact; and of this point of view, which is, as I have said, that of the experienced and of Sankhya, is equally proper to Christianity.

Ques. Then all together, the vision is a
sorry one. - - - - p. 580 "It is not the
spectacle but the profane vision, that of the
unrelated sciences or humanism for example,
that the Vedanta calls an 'illusion' (mohā).
Professor Rawson throughout makes the usual
error of confusing mohā with māyā. Māyā
is properly speaking the 'means-whereby' the
Great magician (māyīn) operates, viz. all the
'measures' (root mā, as in mīrma, to create)
that belong to the divine nature svabhāva,
prakṛti, etc.); and if that which is conse-
quently māyā-māyā, 'natured by magic',
(in Bröckner's sense), viz. our environ-
ment, valusa naturata, becomes the occas-
ion of delusion, that is not the fault of the
divine nature, but of him who is deluded!
What Sankhya denies is the ultimate
reality of things as they are known objectively
or 'ignorantly', i.e. objectively, and as things

Q. K. C. "Vedic Exemplarism". Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies. April 1936.
Harvard-Yenching Institute.

55. "As to our rendering of ātman: in the
citation from Taittiriya, above, 'being' or 'essence'
corresponds to ātman as the supportum
of accidents and in qua non of all
modality (- māya). We have exper-
imented elsewhere with a rendering of
ātman by 'essence', but propose in future
to adhere to a more strictly etymological
equivalent, more especially inasmuch as
the ātman doctrine in RV must be con-
sidered in connection with ā, 119, 2,
avid avitām, equivalent to 'at the
same time ātmanya and avātmanya, or
'equally operated, despirated'. The word
ātman, derived from an or vā, to
'breathe' or 'blow', is in fact more literally

9

spirit', spirit or spiration, and hence
'life'. [For "The translation of ātman as
'Self' is unsatisfactory in any case, and
mainly for two reasons, (1) that it
introduces an altogether unfamiliar term-
inology, one that leads itself to mis-
understandings connected with the
translation 'selfishness', and (2) that
the reflexive use of ātman, which
underlies the rendering 'Self', hardly
occurs in R.V. ātman is 'spirit' as
this word is used for example in the
trilogy 'body, soul, and spirit'
(rūpa, nāma, ātman)"] This
Spirit or Jīva (ātman, vāta, or vāya)
is, as may be understood from what
has been said above, the only property
that can be shared and is thus appar-
ently divided, a Being amongst beings.

Q the breath of life in breathing things of --

p. 46 -- "an altogether simple substance (dharma)"
 --- intellect (manas), aspiration (prāṇah),
 and consciousness (nāṁ) ---

50. note 14, -- "'Cattle' in R.V. are unvestigated potentialities of any kind, of which the proceeding principles desire to take effective possession."

53. "On the other hand, it is not the single form of all potentialities, making arbitrary dispositions ('Heaven gives no orders'), but the specific form of each potentiality that determines each thing's individual mode or character, and gives to it its 'proper likeness' (māṛūpan). In other words, God or Being is the common cause of the becoming of all things, but not

Q immediately of the distinctions between them, which distinctions are determined by 'the varying works inherent within the respective personalities' (Śaṅkarā-~~stake~~ carya, on Vedānta Sūtra, II, 32, 35); they are born according to the measure of their understanding (yathā - prajñā, AA II, 3, 2); or is more commonly implied in RV. according to their several ends or purposes (anta, artha) -----

854. --- "A doctrine of this kind, which makes each creature the source and cause, not of its own being but of its own destiny (and this is what one means by 'free will', although this is in reality a state of bondage, viz. to the idiosyncrasy of the individual will) is common to all tradition, and

has been everywhere expressed in almost the same way: for example 'It is manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves' (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I. q. 116, a, c); 'God's being is bestowed on all creatures alike, only such views it accords to its creativity' (Toulmin, The Following of Christ, English version by Kervell § 154, p 135) etc. ---

p. 63. "On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that individuation and identification are specific limitations, implying the possession of only a particular ensemble of possibilities to the exclusion of all others. 'Speech (vāc) is the cord, and names (naṁāni) the knot whereby all things are bound' (AA, II, 1, 6). Liberation (mukhti), then as distinguished from salvation, is something other than

9
a perpetual and ideal being still ours
and as it were part of the world
picture; liberation in the fullest
sense of the word is a liberation
not merely from phenomenal becom-
ing, but from any nominal
determination whatever. [For 'no longer
fed by form or spirit (namasapad - with-
hustle), the Comprehension reaches
thus the heavenly Person beyond the
you, knowing the ultimate Brahman,
he indeed becomes the Brahman'.

Mundaka Up. III, 18-19]. The cycle
that must for the Wayfarer
begin with the audition - the
finding of a name must for the
Comprehension end in silence, where
no names are spoken, none is
named, and none remembered.

[A vision for silence
meditation 18-19]

These knowledge-of, which would imply
 division, is lost in the coincidence of
 knower and known, 'as a man locked in
 the embrace of a dear bride knows
 naught of a within or a without'
 (Berk. U. IV, 3, 21); there 'none has
 knowledge of such who enters of such who
 enters, that he is no known or known'
 (Kinn); the prayer of the soul is
 answered, 'God, my welfare lies in
 thy never calling me to mind' (Eck-
 hart). "

A.K.C. "The Nature of 'Folklore' and
 'Popular Art'" - Quarterly J. of the Mythic
 Society, Bangalore Vol XXVII, nos 1 & 2.

p. 8. "In a democratic society, where all men are
 theoretically equal, what exists in fact is a
 distinction between a bourgeois culture

Q
on the one hand and the ignorance of
the uneducated masses on the other,
notwithstanding that both classes may
be literate. Here there is no such
thing as a 'folk' (jana), for the
proletariat is not a 'folk', but compar-
able rather to the outcasts (chandala)
than to a fourth estate (vidya); the
sacerdotal (Brahmana) and chival-
rous (kshatriya) classes are virtually
lacking (men are so much alike that
these functions can be exercised by
anyone (the newsmong, for example,
becoming a Pindit), and the lower
grades (varisya) is (assimilated) to
the proletarian (chandala) masses, to
form what is in effect an unanimous
only profane 'herd' (gauri) whose
conduct is governed only by likes and

declines, and not by any higher principles.
 [For a condition of the individual can be
 imagined that is superior to caste; an absolute
pramāṇa, for example, is predicated
 of deity, for whom no function (dharma)
 is too high or too low. The democratic
 condition, on the other hand, is not of
 this nature, but inferior to caste, alike
 from a spiritual and from an economic
 point of view; for as Plato has expressed
 it, 'More will be done, and better done,
 and with more ease, when everyone does
 but one thing, according to his genius;
 and this is justice to each man as he is
 in himself.']. Here the distinction of
 'educated' from 'uneducated' is merely
 technical; it is no longer one of degrees
 of consciousness, but of more or less
 information. Under these conditions

Seem to me, R.K.C. confuses the effect of money with the idea of democracy.
The value of mind created as result of the undisciplined pursuit of education of
China & India parents will have vast consequences and put center on
an entirely different basis! R.K.C.

the distinction of literary from illiterary
has a value altogether different from its
value in traditional societies in which
the whole folk, at the same time
that it is culturally unanimous, is
functionally differentiated; literary, in
the latter case, being quite unnecessary
to some functions, whose measures
its absence does not constitute a
privation, since other means than
books exist for the communication
and transmission of spiritual values;
and, further, under these circum-
stances, the function itself (vadharan
however 'merid' or 'commercial', is
strictly speaking a 'way' (marga), so
that it is not by engaging in other
work to which a higher or lower
social prestige may attach, but to

the extent that a man approaches perfection in his own work and understands its spiritual significance, that he can rise above himself, - an ambition to rise above his fellows having then no longer any real meaning.

10. "In democratic societies, then, where proletarian and profane (i.e. ignorant) values prevail, there arises a real distinction of what is optimistically called 'learning' or 'science' on the part of the educated classes from the ignorance of the masses; and this distinction is measured by standards, not of profundity, but of literacy, in the simple sense of ability to read the printed word. In case there survives any residue of a true prescience (as is still the case

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Europe, but scarcely in America), or when it is a question of the 'primitive' culture of other races, or even of traditional myths and metaphysical traditions that are of anything but popular origin, the 'superstitions' involved (we shall presently see what is really implied by this very apt term) are confounded with the 'ignorance' of the masses, and treated only with a condescending lack of understanding.

"How perverse a situation is thus created can be seen when we realize that where the thread of symbolic and initiatory teaching has been broken at higher social levels (and modern education, whether in India or elsewhere has precisely, and very often

intentionally this ~~effect~~ distinctive effect), it is just the 'superstitions' of the people and what is apparently irrational in religious doctrine that has preserved what would otherwise have been lost. When the bourgeois culture of the universities has thus declined to levels of purely empirical and factual information, then it is precisely and only in the superstitions of the peasantry, wherever there have been strong enough to resist the unwhimpering efforts of the educators, that there survives a genuinely human, and often indeed a superhuman wisdom, however unconscious, and however fragmentary and naive may be the form in which it is expressed. There is, for example, a wisdom in traditional fairy tales (not, of course, in those which have been written by 'literary'

men 'for children') that is altogether different in kind from such psychological sense or nonsense as may be embodied in a modern novel.

"As has been very justly remarked by M. René Guénon, 'the very conception of "folklore", as commonly understood, rests on a fundamentally false hypothesis, the supposition, vide, that there really are such things as "popular creations" or spontaneous inventions of the masses; and the connection of this point of view with the democratic prejudice is obvious. . . . The folk has thus preserved, without understanding, the remains of old traditions that go back sometimes to an interminably distant past, to which we can only refer as "préhistorique".' What has really been preserved in folk and fairy tales, and in

popular peasant art is then by no means a body of merely childish or entertaining fables, or of crude decorative art, but a series of what are really extreme doctrines and symbols of anything but popular invention. One may say that it is in this way, when an intellectual decadence has taken place in higher circles, that this doctrinal material is preserved from one epoch to another, affording a glimmer of light in what may be called the dark night of the intellect; the folk memory serving the purpose of a sort of ark, in which the wisdom of a former age is carried over (trigate) the period of the dissolution of cultures that takes place at the close of a cycle.

"It is not a question of whether or not the ultimate significance of the popular

Q
legends and folk designs is actually understood by those who relate or employ them. These problems arise in much higher circles; in literary history, for example, one is often led to ask, when we find that an epic or romantic character has been imposed on purely mythical material (for example in the Manabhatara and Ramayana, and in the European versions of the Grail and other Celtic material), how far has the author really understood his material? The point that we want to bring out is that the folk material, regardless of our actual qualifications in relation to it, is actually of an essentially marga and not a disti character, and actually intelligible at levels of reference that are far above and by no means inferior

to those of our ordinary contemporary 'learn-
 ing'. It is not at all shocking that this
 material should have been transmitted by
 peasants for whom it forms a part of
 their lives, a reinforcement of their very
 constitution, but who cannot explain;
 it is not at all shocking that the folk
 p 11. material can be described as a body of
 'superstitions', since it is really a body of
 custom and belief that 'stands over' (super-
stat) from a time when its meanings
 were understood. Had the folk beliefs
 not indeed been once understood, we could
 not now speak of them as metaphys-
 ically intelligible, or explain the accuracy
 of their formulation. The peasant may be
 unconscious and unaware, but that of
 which he is unconscious and unaware is
 in itself far superior to the empirical

science and realises out of the 'educated' man, whose real ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that he studies and compares the data of folklore and 'mythology' without any more than the most ignorant peasant suspecting their real significance.

"All that has been said above implies, of course, with even greater force to the anti literature and above all to the Alameda, which so far from representing an intellectually barbarous age (as some pretend) has references so far abstract and remote from historical and empirical levels as to have become almost unintelligible to those whose intellectual capacities have been inhibited by what is nowadays called a 'university education'. It is a matter

at the same time of faith and understanding: the injunctions Credas ut intelligas and Intelligas ut credas ('Believe that you may understand' and 'Understand, in order to believe') are valid in both cases, i.e. whether we are concerned with the interpretation of folklore or with that of the transmitted texts.

A.K.C. "The Pilgrims' Way", from the J. of the Bihar & Orissa Research Society, Vol. XXIII, 1937, Part IV.

p. 18. ... "Fully kṛtām implies 'perfection' and corresponds to kṛtatman, 'perfected spirit' as this term is used in Chāndogya Up.
p. 19. VIII, 15, 'I as kṛtatman am regenerated in the uncreated (akṛtām) Brahman-world.' More often we find the term subhṛtatman as 'perfected spirit'; and

Q just as Śaṅkara explains śukṛta justifying the (Karma-) world in Kaṭha Up. III, 1, by the paraphrase svakṛta, 'self-made', so, but without accepting his etymol. connotation (since, as plainly stated in Chāndogya Up. VII, 13 'neither śukṛtam nor duḥkṛtam can pass over the Bridge of the Spirit', cf. B.G. V, 15 or as Eckhart puts it, 'There neither vice nor virtue ever entered in'), we hold that śukṛtam = śukṛtam, 'perfection', and that a śukṛtatman, in the words of Taittirīya Up. II, 7, 'is called "per-fected" because it made itself' (tad ātmānam akṛanta, tasmād śukṛtam ucyate), cf. 'svayambhū' = autogenes. Lf. śukṛtam in Iśa Up. 17, śukṛtam mṛta must be similarly understood; it is well known what great

importance is attached to the dying thought,
 as having a directive force, and in view of
 the fact that the dying man is thought of
 as an aspirant for passage through the
 midst of the Sun (previous verse 15, and
 of J. V. B. I 3-5) it is inconceivable that he
 should be asked to consider past acts, which
 cannot follow him there; on the other
 hand, it can well be imagined that he
 is asked to consider that (Kirtana) which
 has been 'done', fulfilled, perfected and
 self-effected, to consider in other words
 that very kirtana which in the fourth
 verse of our text is the Traveller's goal].
 It is, then, 'only by ^ekeeping on'
 (carâiva, carâiva) that, as regarded
 from our present position, perfection
 can be achieved; but when this Per-
 fection has been realized, it will not

4
be found to have been effected by our
tool, of which the only trace left will
be the prints of our feet on the Way:
our tooling was not essential to the
being of this Perfection, our own
Perfection, but only dispositive to
our realization of it. As Eckhart
expresses it, 'when I enter there, no
one will ask me whence I come or
whither I went'. The very pilgrim
is now become what he always was
but he only knew it, a Beloved of
the Spirit (~~man~~ mantak, M.H.H.,!)
and is no longer a seeker
(granaya) but is and of the Spirit
that bloweth as it listeth "-----"

A.K.C. "Notes on the Kether Unreined"
New Indian Antiquary Vol. I. #1, Apr. 1935,

p. 43. First Valli. -- Death (mṛtyu, yama) is throughout the Brāhmanas and Upaniṣads, as also in R.V. one of the highest names of God. Identified with the Sun, all that is under the Sun is in his power, and all beyond the Sun is immortal; He is the Breath of life, at whose departure ~~the~~ living beings die (S.B. X.5.1.4. ~~21-4~~ 21-4 and 13, 14, etc). Under the Sun he takes the form of 'repeated death' (punar mṛtyu); beyond the Sun he rules in Paradise. Death does not die. It is only by conquest of ^{the} one and union with the other of his aspects that immortality can be attained, - the Conqueror 'defeats repeated death, death gets him not, Death becomes his spiritual nurse (ātman), he becometh one of the Devas' (B.U. I.2.8), 'he was beyond

the Sun' (CU II.10.5). The solar Orb
Itself, the disk of the Sun, is the gateway of
Death's house, the mansion of Brahman, to
which the Wayfarer seeks admission in our
Upanishad and in so many of the related
texts, e.g. I's 15-16. "In our Upanishad
Death himself is the guru, and facilitates
the śravana and śirya." ---

44. -- "It is the rule that everyman dies
thrice and is thrice born, - first
when he is begotten, second when he is
initiated, and thirdly when he departs
from this world (JUB. II, 9)."

p. 45, note 2. -- "The point of all these compar-
isons is, that it is the Spirit, and not
the individual so-and-so, that is perpetually
and actually whom, although not subject
to the vicissitudes of birth. It is only
the psycho-physical vehicles which are

9 animated by the Spirit, and are in this sense incarnations of the Spirit, or more properly speaking manifestations of the Spirit, that are themselves ^(casually? temporarily) casually determined, and mortal. He only, therefore, who 'knows himself' as the Spirit, and not as the perishable physical vehicle, is free and immortal: and that 'That art thou' follows immediately upon the passage briefly quoted above from CU. VI. 12.2. . . .

p. 46. "It is by knowledge alone, by such knowledge as Atmā himself imparts, that the final passage is made; which knowledge of the Brahman is the knowledge of oneself as the Self, as the Spirit (ātman). This, as all our texts imply (JUB III. 14. 5 etc. with the closest possible parallels -

Q the Hermetic, Christian and Islamic tradi-
tions), is a total severance of the Spirit
from its psycho-physical manifestation,
a ceasing to know of oneself by any
name or aspect (nāma-rūpa), or as
anyone or anywhere: for there can be
no return to the source except of
like to like, and 'That has not come
from anywhere nor become anyone'
(K U. II. 18). The question 'Who
knows where he is?' (K U. II. 25) will
apply as much to the individual
altogether liberated (atimukta etc.)
from his individuality as to the Spirit
itself, which is only omnipresent
precisely because it is not 'anywhere'.
As the Buddhist texts so often stress
it, 'There beyond there is no further exten-
sion of thickness'. (nāparam atthāyati
S.V. 22.10)

Q p. 52. (Referring to the vittamayi sririka of
 K U, II, 3) "There can be no doubt what
 sort of chain it is that hauletas refuses.
 It manifestly represents the 'whatevs
 desires in this mortal world are hard to
 come by' (I. 3), which gods Death offers
 to hauletas, if only he will refrain
 from proving his third boon.
 [f.e. "The 'temptation' of hauletas by
 Muleya, Yama, in our text corresponds
 to the temptation of ^(to hell) Nina in J. I. 63
 (offer of universal sovereignty) and J. I. 78
 (daughters of Nina), and to Matt. 19:8-9
 'all these things will I give thee, if ---'
 and to the temptation of the 'Serpent' in
 Genesis. The Tempter (whether Sowa, or Death,
 Satan, or Serpent) is always one and the
 same T. Ten Father whom the preceding
 Agni foretells in R V. X. 12. 3-4, and the

2
I accepted always the roles 'Man'.
When the Son of Man and Saviour of the
World says 'Get thee behind me,
Satan' this 'behind me' (hind-pani)
is a relegation of Vāsana to his place
in the West A.B. V. 2.3.1 'Yama
holds the overlordship of the whole
extent of earth; he who without asking
from Yama a place of it ...' corresponds
to Sūtra IV. 6 'for that is delivered
into me'; and to whomsoever I will
give it'. In the case of the first
temptation of the Buddha by Māra
(J.I. 63), the Buddha's refusal of
the Wheel Jewel (cakka ratanam),
the recognized symbol of temporal
power, is as much to say 'My thing-
done is not of this world'. It is
in another sense that the Buddha,

Q like Christ, is both King (calravartin)
and Prophet (vittama, M.I. 386).

H The ~~virtually~~ virtually identical character
of the three temptations, those of the
Buddha, the Christ, and Krishna, lends
further support to the view that KU
is the story, not so much of a specific
'human sacrifice' as of the dealings
of the Universal Man with Death; or
if we wish to avoid this conclusion,
it is manifest at least that the
dealings of Krishna with Death is a
'type' of the conquest of Death by the
Universal Man, in the same sense that
the sacrifice of Abraham is 'typical' of
the sacrifice of the Son of Man")
Vittamaya made of, or in the nature
of, wealth, property, goods, possessions:
this is the meaning that is so well

brought out in BU. 1.5.15. 'The
Spiritual-Self (ātman) is the hub,
goods (vitta) the felly (of the wheel
wheel, or of any being). That is why,
if anyone is afflicted by a total loss
(of property), but himself still lives,
they only say "He has come off with
the loss of a felly". - - -

p. 53. "Our vittamārga santā is then
the chain or series of all 'goods',
whether material or mental, considered
slightingly as something over against
the Spiritual-Self; all 'great ~~poss~~
possessions' such as those (amongst
which may be ranked the moral vir-
tues) for the sake of which the rich
man turns away sorrowful,
Matt. XIX. 20. f. and Mark X. 20f.,
'and went away grieved; for he had

great possessions..... 'How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom of God (in our Upanishad, 'Purusha's house', the Sun)... It is easier for a camel ~~to~~ to go through the eye of the needle" [for "We substitute 'the' for 'a' ~~the~~ needle deliberately. The 'camel' is a type of the body and lower soul (astheris and roeris), the 'needle's eye' is the Sun, of Purusha, Mathurani I. 3055-3066 and JU B. III. 14. 1-5. 'There is no hope of eternal life by means of wealth' (amritanga tu nāstasti vittena. BU. II. 4.2) Almost all the 'cultural values' of modern civilization are 'great possessions.']

p. 49
p. 48 "What naistatas = na istata = "one who does not know" or "is unwilling"
Upanishad is, gane.

ALC

From "The New Indian Antiquary" Vol I,

2, May, 1938.

(CU VIII. 3.1-2)

pp. 83. ... Where moreover it is said that

p 84. all these 'true desires' or 'real goods' are to
be gotten by going 'there'; where indeed one
goes every day, viz. to the Brahman world
in deep sleep, but without finding the
hidden treasure, just because of being
'held back by the falsity' (ananta hi
pratyakṛti) while one contr. 'One
who goes hence having found already the
Spirit (or his own Spiritual-existence)
and those whose "true desires" (or 'real
goods'), becomes a "Mover-at-will" in
every world'. CU VIII. 1.6. [cf. note "The
description of the liberated as 'Mover-at-will'
(hāmācārin), corresponding to 'shall go
in and out, and find pasture', in John 8.9,
is of frequent occurrence in the Upanis.

ads, and can be found also in R.V. IX.

113.9 yatrānukāram caranam. 'where
there is motion-at-will', or in other
words, independence of local motion.

Motion-at-will is a necessary consequence
of deification (St. Paul, 'Whoever is
joined unto the Lord is one spirit'; [Gal.
VI. 17; 'That art thou', CU. VI. 8. 9-11])

if only because it is the Gōle of the Spirit
that 'moveth as it will' (yathā vāsam
carati R.V. X. 168. 4) John III. 8 'shall go
in and out, and find pasture' corresponds
to TU. III. 10. 5 imāi lōkān kāmān
kāmān andśaincaran, 'goes hither
or thither in these worlds eating what
food he will and in what shape he will'"]

Similarly, 'It is not for deins of (kāmān)
of beings (as they are) themselves that
beings are deas, but for deins of the

Spirit that beings are seen (prigami)',
BU II. 4.5. [Like St. Thomas, Sum. Theol.
II. 2.7 'But man is not to be loved for his
own sake, but whatever is in man is to be
loved for God's sake'; and I. 6.1 ad 1 and 2
'All things, by desiring their own perfection
desire God Himself' :-----]. The texts
are innumerable in which to be 'possent
of all desires' and to be 'without desire'
are synonymous expressions; no real
meaning, indeed can be attached to
either expression alone, since it is only
when all is already one's own that
no more can even be thought of or
desired (it is in this sense that man
and beast are often interchangeable),
and only where there is nothing
wanting that one cannot want.

prs

Re II.2. yoga-kṣema

p. 85 ~~note~~ 1. ... "it is between yoga and kṣema that the sage and makes his choice, deciding for the latter. That this is the real intention will be immediately realized if we turn to T.S.V.

2.1.7 : here a distinction has already been drawn between those who by means of the liturgy win this world, and those who, studying the Vedic hymns, win yonder world, and as the text continues, 'and so it is that the minds of some are set on yoga (yoge 'nyāsān prajāntām manasā) (footnote 'The mind is unity for men the means either of bondage or release' (Ull. VI.34) and the minds of others on comfort (kṣeme' nyāsām); and accordingly the Wanderer (yājñavalkya) looks it over the man-of-ease (kṣemanyasya īśe), and so too the

Wanders into him down ~~up~~ upon (adhyasa)
asati) 'the man-of-ease' (lesernyasa).

~~And~~ And so in our text the fool prefers
the ease of the householder to the hard
life of the yogi. (footnote 1. "Adhivāsa
sitting before a person's house without taking
food till he ceases to oppose or refuse a
demand (commonly called 'sitting in
dharma')," H.W. The homeless wanderer
is the master of the master of the house;
lesernyasa, from lasi, 'to dwell', being
primarily 'one who has a home' and
secondarily 'one who lives in comfort.'
It is of great interest to notice that the
contemplative life (so often thought of
as one of inaction) is here the really
active life, and that the life of the
householder (usually termed the active
life) is here the really idle life.

This is one way of seeing 'action in
 inaction, and inaction in action.' (B & IV. 8).
 But not the only way; for it need not
 be assumed that it is intended that
 the 'active' life is 'wrong' and the
 'contemplative' life 'right' for every man.
 What is implied is the superiority of
 the 'contemplative' life as such to the
 'active' life as such; a superiority that
 is also assumed in Christian doctrine,
 where it is implied in the story of
 Martha and Mary, and explicit in
 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., II-II, 179-180.
 It is because the Indian householder is
 still of this persuasion that he still
 treats the wandering sādhu or yogi,
 the sannyāsī or 'truly poor man', as
 his superior, and would rather serve
 even those who may be pretenders

there runs my risk of not seeing those
who are really what their cloth proclaims
them. It may be added that the relation
of the Wanderer to the Household is ultim-
ately that of Krishna to Yama, and Mañiketa
— to Yama: Mañiketas is precisely
"sitting unfed" at Death's door, and truly
a balihem.") ---

p. 88. "II.11 continued: abhayanam paramam =
abhayanam titerasatam paramam in III.2.
i.e. nañge lohe (yatra) na bhayanam
himsamāsti, I, 12, 'the place of no-fear,
reached by those who cross over, in
heaven-world (where) there is no fear
whatever', and as the text continues
'not there art thou', i.e. Death as
Mañiketas at first conceives him,
paramaṁ mṛtyuṁ ⁽²⁾ There can be no
doubt about the meaning of 'no fear'.

To have passed beyond fear is to have passed beyond all otherness, to have found the advaitam: for 'Assuredly it is only from another (than oneself) that fear arises' (divitigād vai bhayam bhavati, BU. I. 4.2); and 'When wisely one finds the support 'no-fear' (abhayam pratisthām) in this unen, despoiled, inapplicable, placeless (anibhayan), then is he one that has attained to 'no fear'. (Tu. II. 2)⁽⁴⁾

84. If the separated Persons (Agni, Sūrya, Indra, Vāya, and Death himself) perform their functions 'in fear of him, of Brahman' (KU. II. 3. and TU. II. 8.1), this belongs to their separated Personality, and not to their being in Him, in Whom, the Imperishable (akṣara) 'are all the Devas in one combined' (AA II. 3.8.)" [footnote 3. "Nashtas, of course, are not yet Comprehension,

conceives of Death, not 'as he is yonder'
but 'as he is many in his children' (SBX.
5.2.16) and as the cause of natural death
(SBX. 5.2.13). The distinction of puras
martya from Martya himself, of
death the 'enemy' from Death the 'friend'
is clearly drawn in BL. 1.2.7 where the
conquest of the one is union with the other,
with that Death, viz. 'who does not die',
'the Person in yonder Sam' (SB. 5.2.3) who,
though vaubiles does not yet know it, is
that very ultimate Person spoken of in III. 11,
'beyond whom there is naught, that is the
goal port and last end.' (purnima na param
limit, na karta sapara gati), - the
Person of Va 16, asam purusah so
'ham asmi', 'Yonder Person, I. ...']

[Footnote 4. "Further, AV. X. 8.44 tam an
vidvan na biddhaya martya

atmanam itiram agaram yuvanam

('He who knows that contemplative, incorruptible, ever-youthful Spirit, has no fear of death.');

TU. II. 9. anandan brahmanam

vidvan na bibhethi bhutani ('He who

knoweth beatitude in Brahman feareth nothing whatever,') of. 'Perfect Love casteth out fear'

); Prasna Up. I. 10.

etat amrtam abhayaam etat parayan-

am, stasman na punar avartanti

('That Soul is the immortal, that the crossing

over to where there is 'no-fear', thence there

is no coming back again'). The condition

of 'no-fear', whether of death or anything

whatever, is never referred, nor could it be

~~ever~~ referred, to any other or less state

than that the ~~unconscious~~ conscious and

Supreme Identity. The use of the term

'no-fear' in our verse is therefore the

strongest possible argument for a reference
of the whole to a 'last end' which if
Narcissus had 'renounced', he would
have been a 'simpleton' indeed. } ---

p. 13. ... "If the Son returns to the Father,
the Father is always becoming the Son.

The transcendence of oneness is not a
privation, but an 'all obtaining' (sarvaśakti)
the fulfilment of all desires and the realiza-
tion of all potentialities, from which
'all' we cannot exclude those of formal
manifestation. 'Whoever is joined unto God
is one Spirit,' as St. Paul expresses it,
and the Spirit bloweth as it will,
carati yathavānam (RV. I. 168. 4). It
is with this will that the Compre-
hension's will is one, when he says in
RV. I. 46. 1 'Like a knowing horse,
yoke myself to the pole of the car

[4. You "all
these things
shall be
added unto
you". p. 14.
This suggests
that X. in
Siddhanta
don't go
deep enough]

and that I draw that ferries o'er and
 youth and, nor do I choose between a
 being loved therefore and a coming
 back again. May he, the wayward leader,
 guide me straight.' Sri Krishna
 says of himself, 'There is naught in the
 Three Worlds, O Partha, that remains
 for me to do (kartavyam)' [2. "How
 fully is BG III. 17-18 ---- because in him
 there is no potentiality that has not been
 urged to act.] nor aught forgotten
 that I might yet get, and yet I am in
 act' (varta va ca karmam, BG. III.
 22). It is neither by 'activity alone', nor
 yet by 'inactivity' that Krishna can
 be imitated: 'He who neither inaction
 in action, and action in inaction, is
 wholly in act' (krtva-kartavyam
~~no abhikar~~). krtva-karma-krt, BG

IV. 18. = hatahatajale, HA II. 5 and
MU II. I; and S. I. 140 katambaran-
gam ... abharañam). In the same way it
can be read, and is in fact read by the
aptakāman, ātrakāman akāman, of
BU. IV. 3. 21, that "He whose desire, or
love, is the Spirit, both hath his
desire and is without desire, he findeth
fulfilment of desire in not desiring".
[Noy. notes. Since God, in manifesting
himself in space-time, acts ^{self-}consciously,
we who are ^{self-}conscious manifestations of
Him ought always to work. And the
best work is helping others to live so
they can realize and manifest Him
more fully. He who with (spiritual)
inaction in (physical) action, and (spiritual)
action in (physical) inaction [e.g. as in
contemplation] is (like God) wholly

(and evidently / in act (acting in space-time))

- p. 73. "It has been sufficiently shown that the things that Kantianism is supposed to have abandoned are not those things which are abandoned by a Comprehension. It is not, in fact, 'things' that one abandons, but only false appearances; just as one rejects the notion 'rope' when a snake has been diagnosed, so one rejects any other appearance to which the mind has attached itself⁽¹⁾, and comes into a possession of a truer knowledge, and in the last analysis of Truth itself; one renounces the reflexive reflection⁽³⁾ (imago imaginata) as soon as one perceives its source (imago imaginans)⁽⁴⁾
- p. 74 [Footnote 2. "And which is therefore a matter of 'fond belief', and to be distinguished from 'faith', the nature of which 'consists

in knowledge alone' (St Thomas, Sum-
Theol. . II, II, 42. 13 ad 2). ... Footnote 4. The
converse position is admirably illustrated
by Aesop's story of the Dog and the
Shadow, where the dog, crossing a bridge,
and having a piece of meat in its mouth,
saw the reflection in the water, and
jumps in after it, thus losing the reality
in pursuit of the appearance. ...]

p. 95. "It is precisely from the plane of
'conduct' that the liberated Comprehension,
the known of Brahman, is enlarged:
of .CU. VIII. 4. (where neither the well-
done nor ill-done (na ~~to~~ sukṛtam na
duṣkṛtam) can cross the Bridge of the
Spirit that holds these worlds apart;
MU. VI. 18, vidvān pūṇya-pāpe
vibhāga, 'The Comprehension, putting

away both merit and evil' (also in Mund., III. 1.3); Kane. Up I. 4, 'This one, separated from the well-done and separated from the ill-done, as a comprehension of the Brahman, verily goes forth into Brahman.'; B.G.V. 15. 'The soul accepts neither the evil nor the well-done of anyone' (cf. JUB. I. 5. 1-2); M.I. 135 'If you understand the parable of the raft, you must discard dhamma, and a fortiori adhamma'; John III. 9 'Whosoever is born of God, cannot sin'; Galatians V. 18 'If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law'; Eckhart, 'There neither vice nor virtue ever entered in'. In the second line kṛtakṛtāt states the same position, and may be compared with Taitt. Up. II. 9 where the Comprehension 'is not

only identity. Kasy.

veped by the thought "why have I not
done (nākarāṃ) the good? why have
I done (akārāṃ) the evil?" At
the same time the metaphysical techni-
cality of the formula must not be
overlooked. The 'to be done' (kṛtya,
RV. X. 85. 28; etc, kārisyaṃ, I.
165. 9, VII. 20. 1, kāraṇīyaṃ M.
11. 39) which has 'not yet been done'
(akṛtāṃ) contrasts with that which
'has been done' (kṛtāṃ)⁽¹⁾ or 'perfected'
(ukṛtāṃ) by the 'one who has done
what there was to be done' (kṛtakṛtyaḥ,
AA. II. 5, MU. II. 1), 'who has done
the whole task' (kṛtāṃ-kāraṇa-kṛt
BG & IV. 18), as potentiality (= not-being as
evil) with act (= being as good) Naishatas
is asking to be told of That in which
there is no distinction of potentiality

from act, nature from essence."

p. 97. footnote .1. "We take this opportunity to remark Dionysius, even more perhaps than Eckhart, represents for a European an almost indispensable preparation for any serious approach to the Upanisads."

¹⁰¹
p. 98. (note)--- "Let us observe, in the first place, that the Upanisads, the jñāna kanda, are gnostic treatises by hypothesis, and not ethical treatises; their concern is with the act of knowing God, or in other words with the contemplative life. We cannot expect to find any considerable part of these texts devoted to the exposition of prudence. The most that can be expected in these contexts is a full

recognition of the indispensable dispositive
value of 'means', and this is just what
we find in KU. II. 24 and the corresponding
Mund. Up. III. 2.3 (which Rawson very
properly cites p 113), & BG. II. 44; it is
very clear, however, that the ethical
means, however indispensable, are not
ends in themselves, but means to an
end beyond themselves. This is also the
Christian doctrine; prudence is essential
to the active life, but accidental to the
contemplative life (St. Thomas. Sum.
Theol. II-II, 180.2 'the moral virtues do
not belong to the contemplative life essen-
tially On the other hand, the moral
virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively.' & 'There is said to be the
contemplative life who are chiefly intent
on the contemplation of truth. The

contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action pertains to the intellect', and must be distinguished from the mere observation of things by the senses or the intellect and from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. ib. 180.1, - the last observation showing very clearly that neither 'science' nor 'philosophy' in the modern sense of the words pertains to the contemplative life, but to the active life.) It is not, therefore, any defect in the Upanisads that they are not expository of ethics; those 'who are especially intent on external actions' are expected to obey the laws of ritual and conduct (Dharma in both senses) which are laid down in the Dharma ~~the~~ Sāstras, in which the first principles with which alone the Upanisads are

concerned are applied to specific ~~cases~~ contingencies; while obedience is also and at the same time an indispensable preparation or qualification for the contemplative life, as asserted in our texts, KU. II. 24. and Mund. Up. III. 2.3, BU. IV. 4.9.

p. 100. [Third Valli.]

"III. 1 continued: On the other hand, it is most unlikely that subhitasya loke means 'in the righteous world'. Mund. I. 2. 6-10 indicates those who think that 'this that has been earned by their merit and what has been well done (punyate, nikatah) is the Brahma-world --- the fools who delight in that (world won by merit) as their 'better'. ---

101

p. 98. "Third Valli. III. 1: eta, 'come

order, Greek kosmos, Latin ordo - - As
the Sun is Truth (satyam, param),
so the Universe is Order: iyam va itam
asau (aditya) satyam, TS. V. 1.5.9.

Rita is the order of the universe, manifested
under the Sun, and seen by whoever it
may be that see through and with the
solar 'Eye', the 'Eye of Mitravarmān'
(RV. V. 51.1, VII. 61.1 and 63.1). JUB III.

36.5 identifies itam with brahman
(om'ity itad vāḥ saram itam); whose
self-intention is therefore the act of
'creation', as in BSU I. 4.10 'In the
beginning, this cosmos was Brahman
(~~became~~ brahma vā itam agra āsit).
That knew itself and said "I am Brahman."
Thenceforth that became the All.' What
Mitrovarmān, apara and para Brahman,
thus 'know' or 'see' is the 'World picture'.

(jagat-ātmā) painted by the Spiritual-
essence (ātman) on the canvas of itself,
in which it takes great delight.' (Sāṅkhya
Svātmāni-rūpaṇa, 75) : the 'speculum
aeternum', eternal mirror, in
which God sees himself and all things, and
in which those contemplatives who also
gaze perceive likewise all things more
clearly than in any other way, and so
also see 'themselves' more truly than 'as
they are in themselves' (Augustine and
Monanventura)⁽¹⁾; for as B.U.I. 4.10 contin-
ues, 'Whoever of the Devas is awakened
(pratyabodhigata)'⁽²⁾ therunto, he indeed
has become it, and so too in the case of
Prophets and that of men Yea,
here and now (ītaḥ-hi), whoever
knows that 'I am Brahman', enters
into that 'this', he becomes 'this

all' (sa idam sarvam bhavati),
 nor can any Deva hinder him from
 thus becoming."

[see next note book for continuance].

Index
1)

Creative effort of m.v.a. 97, 128-137,

Return to India 87, 88, 91, 126,

K + manual work 1, 2, 21, 24, 31, 35, 49, 65-71, 74, 77, 87, 118-120-

Meditation 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 15-21, 34, 56, 55, 57, 96, 104-107-111, 132,
137, 137, 150,

group activities 2, 39

self respect 29,

democracy 24,

sentiments 27, 39, 62, 96, 113,

Training 34, 89- , 137,

Socialism 42-48,

Money 49, 61, 116-127, 154.

emotions 80-81

freedom 84,

education 84-

voluntary simplicity 87-88

integration of re. programs
creative power of re 97,

47 116-127,

Science 97

Science & religion 97

Sadhana 99 + 111, 116, 137, 151, 183-199,

will 109, 129,

specific sentiments 113-116.

criticisms of re -

relation of re to relig. & church

reasons for optimism -

democracy 24, 151-157,

child psychology 52-55-61

advantage of sensitive conscience 90-91

love 113-116,

humility 109, 101,

indignation 102,

Assumptions 97



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"The Human Problem of an Industrial Civilization" - Elton Mayo
pp. 1-87

"On Compromise" - John Morley
pp. 89-96

"What I Believe" - J.D. Beresford
pp. 97--116

"Capitalism in Crisis" - James Henry Rogers
pp. 116--126, with review p. 127

"Suggestion and Autosuggestion" - Baudouin
pp. 128- 137

"Mediaeval Aesthetic" (St. Thomas Aquinas or Dionysius) A.K. Coomaraswamy
pp. 137-140

"A Study of the Katha-Upanisad" - "
pp. 140-144

"Vedic Exemplarism" - "
pp. 145-151

"The Nature of Folklore and Popular Art" - "
pp. 151-163

"The Pilgrim's Way" - "
pp. 163-166

"Notes on the Katha Upanisad" - "
pp. 166- 199 and continued in next notebook

Specific Dates

- Elton Mayo - "Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization" - pp 1-86
- John M. W. - "On Compromise" - pp 89-96
- J. D. Bedford - "What I Believe" - pp 97-116
- James Hamer Rogers - "Capitolium in Crisis" - 116-125
- C. Baudouin - "Suggestion & Autosuggestion" - 128-136
- A. K. Coomaraswamy - "Medieval Aesthetics" - 137-140
- " - "Study of Katha Upan" - 140-144
- " - "Vedic Exemplarism" - 145-
- " - "The Nature of Folklore Pop. Art" - 151-163
- " - "The Pilgrim's Way" - 163-166
- " - "Notes on the Katha Upan." - 166-177

